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Haas, Joseph Raymond, Ph.D. The Effects of Verbal Consequences for Rule-
Following on Sensitivity to Programmed Contingencies of Reinforcement. (1991) 
Directed by Dr. Steven C. Hayes. 196 pp. 
This study examined the effects of two types of verbal consequences for 
rule-following and their impact on subject's responses to programmed schedules of 
reinforcement. The first type of consequence involved feedback on the 
correspondence between the subject's behavior and the behavior specified in an 
antecedent rule. A second type of consequence involved this same feedback plus 
feedback on the number of points earned for task performance. Some subjects 
were given accurate feedback with respect to rule-following and some were told 
that the rule was being followed regardless of behavior. 
The task involved moving a circle through a grid on a video screen using 
telegraph keys operating on a multiple schedule of reinforcement. Successful task 
performance resulted in the delivery of a point, exchangeable for chances at a 
cash prize. The subjects were given an accurate rule that specified the 
appropriate behavior for a DRL 6/FR 18 multiple schedule of reinforcement with 
two-minute components. After 32 minutes of responding, this schedule was 
changed, without announcement, to a FR 1/FI Yoked schedule of reinforcement. 
The change from the DRL 6 to the FR 1 enabled an increase in effectiveness 
(more points could be earned in a given unit of time) and the change from the 
FR 18 to the FI Yoked enabled an increase in efficiency (fewer responses could 
earn the same number of points). The changed contingencies were kept in place 
for 64 minutes. 
Verbal consequences began 12 minutes before the schedule change and 
remained in effect for 32 minutes after the change. Verbal consequences were 
removed for the final 32 minutes. 
Rule-following feedback did not affect the subject's response to the 
efficiency-based or effectiveness-based change. Accurate rule-following feedback 
plus feedback on task performance produced comparatively lower response rates 
following the effectiveness-based transition in spite of the fact that high response 
rates produced more points. This effect was still evident following the withdrawal 
of the verbal consequences. Rule-following feedback plus feedback on task 
performance was posited to increase the specificity of the feedback as well as to 
result in a change in the consequential function of points. 
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Much of human affairs involves verbal interactions. Education, 
management, government, and psychotherapy all involve one person altering or 
affecting the behavior of another person via the use of language. The efficacy of 
changing behavior by instruction is assumed in these major human endeavors. 
Understandably, instructional control has received much attention in 
behavior-analytic research and theory. In his theoretical analysis of problem-
solving, Skinner (1969), discussed the effects of rules or instructions on human 
learning. The role of verbal stimuli or instructions in the control of human 
behavior has received much empirical attention in operant psychology in recent 
years (Baron & Galizio, 1983). In behavioral terms, people learn both by 
experiencing the programmed contingencies first hand and by being told about 
these contingencies in the form of instructions. The bulk of human operant 
research to date indicates that instructions often exert stronger control over 
behavior than do the programmed reinforcers (Baron & Galizio, 1983). Although 
many studies have demonstrated control by instructions (eg., Baron, Kaufman, & 
Stauber, 1969; Buskist, Bennett, & Miller, 1981; Hayes, Brownstein, Zettle, 
Rosenfarb, & Korn, 1986b; Kaufman, Baron, & Kopp, 1966; Lippman & Meyer, 
1967; Shimoff, Catania, & Matthews, 1981), more work is necessary in order to 
understand more fully the parameters of this control. Some variables, such as the 
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effects of social factors on adherence to instructions, have received empirical 
examination (Brey 1987; Hayes, Rosenfarb, Wulfert, Munt, Korn, & Zettle, 1985; 
Reuger, Gaydos, Quinn, & Deitz, 1986; Rosenfarb & Hayes, 1984) while others 
have not yet been addressed. 
One factor that seems to have received little empirical attention is 
feedback from the verbal community regarding instruction following. That such 
feedback plays a role seems obvious. Phrases such as "You did a good job 
following instructions" or "See, reading instructions makes it much easier to finish 
your homework quickly" are phrases that might be heard in an educational setting. 
Even though feedback is a common everyday concept, there is little human 
operant research on the role of verbal consequences and their interaction with 
rule-governed behavior. 
The present study explores this general issue with respect to rule-governed 
behavior. It is concerned with how verbal consequences related to rule-following 
influence the way that rules control behavior. 
More is known about the role of verbal stimuli as antecedents than about 
their role as consequences. Thus, my strategy in this introduction will first be to 
examine the literature on control by antecedent verbal stimuli and the variables 
that influence it. This review will then be used as a guide to the identification of 
variables that might influence the effects of verbal consequences and how verbal 
consequences might interact with rule-governed behavior. 
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Behavior-Analvtic Research on Instructional Control 
Research on the interaction of instructions and programmed contingencies 
leads to one strong conclusion: Instructions exert strong control over human 
behavior to the extent that they consistently override control by programmed 
contingencies of reinforcement (Buskist et al., 1981; Kaufman et al., 1966; 
Matthews, Shimoff, Catania, & Sagvolden, 1977). So strong is this control under 
some conditions that it has been said that "insensitivity is a defining property of 
instructional control" (Shimoff et al., 1981) "Insensitivity," however, is but a 
description of an outcome and begs the question of what contingencies actually 
produce instructional control. 
The Human Operant Research Strategy 
The research paradigm for human operant research is typically a simple 
extension of the operant chamber used to study nonhuman schedule performance. 
Human subjects work in small rooms with levers, buttons, or telegraph keys as 
manipulanda, colored lights as stimuli, and points or money as consequences. The 
schedules of point delivery (e.g., interval and ratio schedules) are identical to the 
schedules of reinforcement that have been studied with non-humans (e.g., Ferster 
& Skinner, 1957). 
Evidence of Instructional Control 
Human responses to schedules of reinforcement are often altered by the 
presence of very subtle verbal cues. Demonstrating one button push (Matthews et 
al., 1977), mentioning that a response is necessary (Kaufman et al., 1966), and 
telling a subject to earn the maximum number of consequences possible in a set 
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time limit (Buskist et al., 1981) can result in very high rates of responding even 
when high response rates were not required to satisfy the contingency. Given 
these findings, it is not surprising that more detailed verbal instructions often 
exert strong control over behavior in spite of competing programmed 
contingencies. 
The Interaction of Instructions and Programmed Contingencies 
Two main strategies have been used to assess the joint effects of 
instructions and programmed contingencies. One strategy examines the effects of 
instructions on behavior patterns observed on single schedules of reinforcement 
(Buskist et al., 1981; Buskist & Miller, 1986; Kaufman et al., 1966). Another 
examines the sensitivity of instruction-produced behavior to changes in 
programmed contingencies of reinforcement. Multiple schedules of reinforcement 
(Baron et al., 1969; Hayes et al., 1986b), and unannounced changes in schedules 
are employed in this strategy (Hayes, Brownstein, Haas, & Greenway, 1986a; 
Shimoff et al., 1981). 
The Effects of Instructions on Human Schedule Performance 
Studies concerned with schedule patterns typically examine the effects of 
instructions on behavior which is also exposed to a programmed schedule of 
reinforcement. It sometimes appears that accurate instructions which specify the 
actual programmed contingency can produce behavior that maximizes 
reinforcement and that appears similar to non-human schedule patterns (Baron et 
al., 1969; Kaufman et al., 1966) as well as to the patterns produced by 
uninstructed humans (Buskist et al., 1981). 
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However, a closer look reveals that inaccurate instructions which specify a 
response rate appropriate for a different schedule can induce response rates that 
are not similar to non-human performance on the actual programmed schedule 
(Buskist & Miller, 1986; Kaufman et al., 1966; Lippman & Meyer, 1967). In 
addition, when different instructions are given to different groups of subjects 
working on the same schedule, their behavior appears to be controlled by the 
respective instructions rather than the programmed schedule (Buskist et al., 1981; 
Kaufman et al., 1966). Finally, the strength of instructional control is emphasized 
by the finding that subjects who are instructed to respond at various rates have 
responded for as long as two or three hours in extinction sessions in which their 
responses were never followed by a programmed consequence (Kaufman et al., 
1966). 
Research on schedule patterns shows that instructions can evoke behavior 
across a wide range of situations. Instructions which specify a contingency can 
evoke behavior that appears appropriate to that contingency (Baron et al., 1969; 
Kaufman et al., 1966). However, under some conditions (Buskist & Miller, 1986; 
Kaufman et al., 1966; Lippman & Meyer, 1967), it does not matter if the 
contingency specified in the instructions is actually programmed or not. Early 
suggestions that instructions can be used to generate schedule-sensitive behavior 
similar to that of nonhuman subjects (Baron et al., 1969) need to be qualified in 
light of the latter findings. 
The research on schedule patterns is not completely adequate for studying 
the interaction of rules and programmed contingencies. In this paradigm, 
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sensitivity is measured in two ways: a) by the behavioral differences between 
subjects given instructions and subjects given minimal instructions, and b) by the 
degree to which human schedule patterns correspond to schedule patterns shown 
in nonhuman subjects. A problem with minimal instructions is that they can 
produce their own type of instructional control which is also capable of overriding 
control by the programmed instructions (Matthews et al., 1977; Shimoff et al., 
1981). In addition, when humans produce "non-human like" behavior patterns, 
this behavior itself may still be under instructional control (Shimoff et al., 1981). 
Similar human and non-human behavior patterns may still be under the control of 
grossly different variables. 
The Effects of Instructions on Sensitivity to Schedule Changes 
When instructions produce behavior that appears to be controlled by the 
programmed contingencies, the behavior may still be controlled by instructions 
(Hayes et al., 1986a; Shimoff, Matthews, & Catania, 1986). The controlling 
variables can be determined by an unannounced change in the programmed 
contingencies. If a behavior change is observed following a change in 
programmed contingencies, then the contingencies are said to control the 
behavior. If no change in behavior is observed, then the rule is said to control the 
behavior. 
Behavior that is shaped or established by minimal instructions is often 
relatively sensitive to changes in programmed contingencies (Hayes et al., 1986a; 
Matthews et al., 1977; Shimoff et al., 1981). However, behavior that is established 
by more detailed instructions is often quite insensitive to schedule changes (Hayes 
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et al., 1986a; Matthews et al., 1977; Shimoff et al., 1981). This insensitivity is 
observed when instructions evoke both high (Matthews et al., 1977) and low 
(Shimoff et al., 1981) rates of responding. 
Instructed subjects show less behavior change than uninstructed subjects in 
response to several different types of schedule changes: Changes that result in 
no potential increase in consequence delivery (Shimoff et al., 1981), changes that 
result in a great potential increase in consequences (Shimoff et al., 1981), changes 
that allow for a substantial decrease in responding with no change in the rate of 
consequence delivery (Galizio, 1979), and changes that totally remove all 
programmed consequences (Hayes et al., 1986a; Matthews et al., 1977). 
Multiple schedules have also been used to study sensitivity to changes in 
programmed schedules. A multiple schedule involves a set of rapidly alternating 
schedule components. The different schedules should in principle generate 
distinctly different response rates (e.g., a fixed ratio normally generates very high 
response rates, and a fixed interval generates much lower response rates). If the 
subject's behavior shows distinctly different response rates in each component, the 
programmed schedules are thought to control the behavior. 
Uninstructed subjects often show undifferentiated responding in multiple 
schedules, especially if they contain several components (Baron et al., 1969; 
Galizio, 1979; Hayes et al., 1986a, 1986b). Instructions which specify the 
contingencies operating in each component of a multiple schedule appear to 
readily generate response differentiation or sensitivity to the different components 
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(Baron et al., 1969; Galizio, 1979; Hayes et al., 1986a, 1986b). However, this 
behavior is still not necessarily sensitive to the programmed schedules involved. 
Response differentiation is also evident in instructed subjects who do not 
receive immediate contingent feedback when schedule requirements are met 
(Baron et al., 1969). In addition, instructions that accurately specify only one 
component in a two-part multiple schedule can evoke similar behavior in both 
components (Hayes et al., 1986b). Finally, behavior produced by instructions may 
appear to be sensitive to the separate schedules but still fail to change when one 
or both components in a multiple schedule are changed to a new schedule (Hayes 
et al., 1986a; Shimoff et al., 1986). 
Taken together, the research on the interaction of instructions and 
programmed contingencies shows that instructions often override control by 
programmed contingencies of reinforcement. The research reviewed thus far 
demonstrates the powerful control that can be exerted by instructions. It does not 
demonstrate how instructions come to exert this control. In the following sections, 
the theory and research that addresses this issue will be reviewed. 
Contingency-Shaped and Rule-Governed Behavior 
Skinner (1969) described rules as a complex type of stimulus. He made a 
distinction between contingency-shaped behavior and a subset of 
contingency-shaped behavior called rule-governed behavior. Contingency-shaped 
behavior is behavior that is shaped by direct contact with its consequences. It is 
essentially another name for operant behavior. 
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The card game of draw poker provides an example of contingency-shaped 
behavior. Some poker players learn to play by direct experience. The behavior of 
these players is subtly shaped by the consequences of drawing new cards across a 
wide range of circumstances. For example, they may learn to avoid drawing to an 
inside straight. If asked why, they may not be able to give reasons verbally . 
They might say that they act on "intuition" or "hunches." In this case, poker 
playing is an example of contingency-shaped behavior. 
In Skinner's view, rule-governed behavior is behavior that is controlled by a 
special type of stimulus: one which specifies a contingency. The behavior of a 
poker player who is playing according to a book on the statistical odds of getting 
each type of poker hand is an example of rule-governed behavior. This player's 
play is controlled by the rules in the book which specify the contingencies involved 
in playing poker. In this case, the poker playing is rule-governed. 
Rules and exposure to contingencies may generate behavior that appears 
similar. For example, both persons discussed above may turn out to be excellent 
poker players. However, their card-playing behavior may actually be quite 
different because it is controlled by different variables. For example, if some 
cards were removed from the deck, it may be more conceivable that 
contingency-shaped playing would adjust to the new circumstances while the 
rule-governed playing would not. For the contingency-shaped behavior, the 
controlling variables (the probability of certain hands occurring) would have 
changed while for the rule-governed behavior the controlling variables (the rules 
in the book) remain the same. This example is of course a simple one. 
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Depending on the history of the player whose behavior is under the control of the 
rules, she might eventually look for a new book or stop following the rules. The 
sensitivity of the contingency-shaped play might only be shown sooner than a 
change in rule-governed play. 
The distinction between contingency-shaped and rule-governed behavior 
serves as a reminder that human behavior can be controlled by complex forms of 
verbal stimuli as well as by consequences of behavior. In Skinner's view, this 
distinction does not point to two different functional classes of behavior. Both 
contingency-shaped and rule-governed behavior are controlled by contingencies 
of reinforcement. Rule-governed behavior is only different in that it involves a 
special type of antecedent stimulus. For Skinner, the distinction between 
rule-governed and contingency-shaped behavior is a purely formal one designed to 
highlight all of the relevant variables that control human behavior. 
Galizio (1979) empirically studied the hypotheses that rules acted as 
discriminative stimuli. As is the case with nonverbal discriminated operants, rule-
governed behavior can be brought under the control of a conditional 
discriminative stimulus. One stimulus was only present when instructions led to 
effective contact with the programmed consequences and another was only 
present when instructions did not lead to effective contact. Subjects followed 
instructions in the presence of the first stimulus and did not follow instructions in 
the presence of the second stimulus. In a further attempt to demonstrate 
similarity between rules and nonverbal discriminative stimuli, Galizio's experiment 
also demonstrated that rules can act as reinforcers, a characteristic that is readily 
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demonstrated with nonverbal discriminative stimuli in the non-human literature. 
Subjects responded on a button-pushing task when the consequence was access to 
session rules. 
Galizio interpreted these data to mean that rules do function like other 
types of discriminative stimuli. The implication is that rules exert their control 
solely via discriminative processes; understanding their effects requires no other 
additional analytic concepts. While these data show that rules possess some of 
the same qualities as discriminative stimuli, recent work has questioned whether 
typical demonstrations of control by rules meet the strict definitional criteria 
(Michael, 1980) of a discriminative stimulus (Blakely & Schlinger, 1987; Schlinger 
& Blakely, 1987). In addition to evoking behavior, rules seem to alter the 
function of environmental events. A more thorough account of how function-
altering may work will be presented in a later section. Function-altering seems to 
require a more complex account of how stimuli acquire functions. For purposes 
of the immediate discussion, it is sufficient to say that Galizio's study does not 
provide definitive evidence that rules function purely as discriminative stimuli. If 
other processes are involved in establishing control by rules, it is conceivable that 
rule-following could still be brought under conditional control and that rules 
would function as reinforcers. What is important about Galizio's findings is that 
they provide evidence that rules as stimuli seem to participate in contingencies of 
reinforcement much like other stimuli. In the following section, more discussion 
will be devoted to the types of contingencies that establish control by rules. 
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The Pliance-Tracking Distinction 
Zettle and Hayes (1982) have developed an analytic framework for 
describing classes of rule-governed behavior. They define rule-governed behavior 
as behavior which is controlled by an antecedent stimulus which is verbal in 
nature. In addition, rule-governed behavior is characterized by its potential 
contact with two different contingencies of reinforcement: Contingencies in the 
natural non-arbitraiy environment and contingencies which are arbitrarily 
established by the social community. 
Zettle and Hayes (1982) distinguished between two main classes of 
rule-governed behavior based on the types of contingencies that are involved in 
their formation and maintenance. While each class of rule-governed behavior 
involves behavior that is under the control of a verbal discriminative stimulus, the 
division is based on the different contingencies of reinforcement which shape and 
maintain that discriminative control. 
Rules can evoke behavior that contacts contingencies existing in the natural 
environment. Tracking is the name used when rule-following is based on a history 
of experience with the specification of behavior-consequence relations that are 
actually present in the natural environment (both social and non-social). The 
discriminative control exerted by the rule is established by natural reinforcement 
for the behavior it evokes. In addition, the behavior that is generated by tracks 
produces reinforcing stimuli even if the track is not present. For example, a rule 
might state 'To go from Reno to Carson City take route 395 South." If the person 
follows such a rule because similar rules in the past have lead to specific 
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consequences, then this is tracking and the rule is a track. If a person follows this 
specific rule due to such a history, we assume that getting to Carson City is 
already reinforcing. Driving route 395 would lead to Carson City even if the 
person was never given the rule. The rule evokes behavior that contacts this 
natural contingency. 
Pliance refers to rule-produced discriminative control that is shaped by the 
verbal community when it provides reinforcement for a correspondence between a 
rule and behavior. The contingencies which are laid down by the verbal 
community may be independent of the natural consequence of this behavior. In 
other words, the verbal community provides reinforcement for rule-following in 
and of itself. A rule that participates in such contingencies is called a ply. An 
example would be a parent who enforces the rule "Clean up your room before you 
go outside!" When the child asks "How come?" a parent employing a ply might 
say "Because I told you so. That's how come." 
The verbal community establishes rules as discriminative stimuli by 
reinforcing appropriate behavior in the presence of rules and punishing 
inappropriate behavior. In pliance, the stimulus control exerted by rules is 
maintained by social contingencies supporting a correspondence between the rule 
and the behavior. Other sources of reinforcement that might naturally follow the 
behavior in question (e.g. being able to find things more readily in a clean room) 
are not involved in pure pliance. The listener follows the speaker's rule, because 
of a history of reinforcement for obedience and a history of punishment for 
noncompliance. Unlike tracking, which can involve social consequences, pliance 
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must involve them, because only the social community can explicitly identify and 
deliver consequences for the rule-behavior correspondence. 
In the preceding analysis, the case is made that these two distinct sets of 
contingencies can establish distinct types of rule-following: Tracking and pliance. 
In the examples employed, the same rule could be either a track or a ply 
depending on the contingencies that produce rule-following. Because of the two 
different sources of control, it is possible that plys and tracks evoke behavior with 
different characteristics. On the one hand, behavior produced by the kind of 
contingencies involved in tracking is expected to be controlled by and thus 
sensitive to the natural contingencies in the environment and specified in the rule. 
Pliance, on the other hand, leads to control by the behavioral specification in the 
rule as opposed to any other contingencies that may be present in the natural 
environment. 
Very little research has dealt with tracking or situations in which rules 
actually enhance control by natural contingencies. In fact, when rules appear to 
induce behavior that is controlled by programmed contingencies, this behavior has 
later been shown to actually be rule-governed (Hayes et al., 1986a). The almost 
exclusive concern with the "insensitivity" effect has geared most research toward 
pliance-related issues. Empirical evidence for the contingencies involved in 
tracking can be gleaned from some of these studies, but the data are slim and 
loosely tied together. We do know that rules sometimes control behavior and 
sometimes do not. Hayes et al. (1986a) demonstrated that 50% of the instructed 
subjects showed substantial decreases in responding when the schedule changed 
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from an FR 18 to extinction. The behavior of subjects who were not insensitive 
to the contingency change provides an example of behavior that was initially 
established by rules yet was ultimately sensitive to changes in the programmed 
contingencies of reinforcement. One interpretation of this effect would be that 
the reinforcement history for these "sensitive" subjects heavily supported control 
by natural contingencies as opposed to compliance with the rule regardless of 
cost. However, this remains an interpretation given that such a history was not 
actually manipulated in that study. 
There is some evidence that subjects discriminate between contexts in 
which rules are successful and not successful in achieving natural consequences. 
Galizio (1979) demonstrated that subjects can discriminate between contexts in 
which rules produce behavior that contacts programmed consequences and 
contexts in which they do not. This would be expected if rule-following was 
actually supported by the programmed contingencies as opposed to contingencies 
for compliance. 
Additional empirical support for a tracking analysis comes from differential 
effects of rules with distinctly different forms. Contingency descriptions seem to 
produce more sensitivity to programmed contingencies than performance 
descriptions (Matthews, Catania, & Shimoff, 1985). Specifying the entire 
contingency would be expected to induce sensitivity to the contingency while a 
performance specification is more likely to produce correspondence between 
actual performance and the performance specified in the rule. The verbal 
community may specify programmed consequences for rule-following when 
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ultimate control by these consequences is desired. When only compliance is 
desired, the form of the behavior is all that is specified. However, this is only an 
interpretation of existing data and direct empirical support for a tracking based 
analysis is lacking. 
The hypothesized mechanism in pliance has some indirect empirical 
support from research that examines the role of social influence in increasing 
adherence to rules. Remember that pliance depends on a social community which 
evaluates rule-behavior correspondence and doles out reinforcement when such a 
correspondence is observed. Rules seem to exert less control in private situations 
where the influence of the verbal community is minimized (Brey, 1987). If the 
social community has no access to the rule or the subjects' behavior, then current 
consequences for compliance are difficult to provide. This is not to say that 
subjects in a private setting would not show pliance. A history of experience with 
such contingencies could affect behavior regardless of current contingencies in the 
private setting. However, manipulations that insure privacy and thus minimize the 
contingency for pliance have been shown to affect the degree to which rules 
control behavior. For example, the presence of another person in the 
experimental room tends to increase the likelihood of rule-following (Reuger et 
al., 1986). 
People with higher levels of social anxiety may be more sensitive to the 
contingencies involved in pliance. Scores on a personality inventory that assesses 
"rigidity" have been shown to be correlated with observed rule-following (Wulfert, 
Shull, Hayes, & Greenway, 1987). The scale used in this study was loaded 
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towards the factor of social anxiety. People who are anxious in social situations 
may respond more readily to social reinforcement or punishment. Doing what is 
socially accepted is a way of avoiding aversive stimulation in social situations. 
Data on the effectiveness of instruction-based therapies indicates that 
modeling (Rosenfarb & Hayes, 1984), self-coping statements (Hayes & Wolf, 
1984; Zettle & Hayes, 1983), self-reinforcement (Hayes et al., 1985), and goal 
setting (Hayes et al., 1985) are much more effective when conducted in public 
settings than in private. In addition, self-instructions were not effective at all in 
the private settings provided in these studies. This suggests that even things that 
people say to themselves seem to be controlled by their possible participation in 
public contingencies provided by the community. This evidence from the applied 
arena further suggests the importance of the social community in establishing 
control by rules and lends support to the notion of pliance. 
Data on the effects of rule form are also supportive of the plausibility of a 
pliance-based account of persistence in rule-following. Performance descriptions 
generate stronger rule-following than contingency descriptions (Matthews et al., 
1985). It seems plausible that the social community uses performance descriptions 
when doing what one is told despite other sources of control (i.e., pliance) is in 
the best interest of the community. Orders or commands often take the form of 
performance descriptions. Contingency descriptions may be used when coming 
under effective control by the specified contingencies is to the advantage of the 
community (what is usually called advice or descriptions). Specific rules have also 
been shown to generate more rule-following than general rules (Olson & Hayes, 
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1984). When a specific rule is present, it may be easier for the community to 
evaluate the degree of rule-behavior correspondence. Less variability in rule-
following would be expected in these conditions. When subjects' guesses about 
rules are shaped by the experimenter, more compliance is produced than when 
the experimenter instructs subjects what to guess (Catania, Matthews, & Shimoff, 
1982). When guesses are generated by shaping, persons might be under increased 
social pressure to behave in accordance with their own guesses than if they were 
told what to guess. People are rarely told explicitly what to say and then held 
accountable for a correspondence between this saying and relevant behavior. 
Taken together, these data suggest that the contingencies described in 
pliance may be responsible for occurrence of persistent rule-following even when 
the subject contacts changes in programmed contingencies. Russell (1986), in an 
attempt to study directly the contingencies involved in pliance, examined the 
effects of social feedback for rule-following on the response to changes in the 
programmed contingencies. This feedback did not seem to increase rule-following 
above and beyond that seen in the presence of task instructions alone. However, 
in this study, behavior that corresponded to the rule was periodically followed by 
the word "good" which appeared on the television monitor displaying the task. 
The subjects were never told that "good" was for following rules, and the data 
suggested that this stimulus either served as a reinforcer only for task 
performance (not rule- following) or did not act as reinforcer at all. 
In summary, the theoretical analyses presented by Skinner (1969) and 
Zettle and Hayes (1982) have received moderate amounts of empirical support. 
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These accounts are based on explanations of the types of contingencies that 
establish rules as stimuli that directly evoke behavior. However, in addition to 
direct evocative effects on behavior, the specification of a contingency also seems 
to affect the functions of antecedents and consequences for behavior. In other 
words, rules affect behavior as well as the function of the environmental events 
that surround it. This issue is related to a general interest in the "special" nature 
of contingency specification and how it comes to actually affect behavior and the 
function of environmental events. Some recent theoretical work has addressed 
these issues. 
The Function-Altering Effects of Rules 
Schlinger and Blakely (Blakely & Schlinger, 1987; Schlinger & Blakely, 
1987) argue that rules work in one of two ways. On the one hand rules often 
work directly, as when one person says "stand up" to another. They view this kind 
of control as simple discriminative control and not deserving of a special term or 
label. They further argue that a true discriminative stimulus evokes behavior 
almost immediately (Michael, 1980). On the other hand, there are often long 
temporal delays between the presentation of the rule and the behavior indicative 
of rule-following. Furthermore, rules also seem to alter the function of 
environmental events, a trait not traditionally ascribed to discriminative stimuli. 
Based on these two points, Schlinger and Blakely argue that rules are not 
discriminative stimuli at all. They prefer to reserve the term "rule" for 
contingency-specifying stimuli that alter the function of environmental events. 
Take for example the following rule: "When the bell rings, take the cake out of 
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the oven and I will pay you one dollar." A person hearing this rule may in fact 
take the cake out of the oven at the sound of the bell even after a significant 
amount of time has elapsed since the rule was given. Taking the cake out of the 
oven does not occur immediately following rule delivery. Furthermore the bell 
now evokes this behavior when in the past it may not have. The function of the 
bell has changed from neutral to evocative. 
Rules can alter the functions of antecedent stimuli, as in the example 
above, or consequential stimuli. The statement, "No pain, no gain!" may establish 
muscle strain as a reinforcer for weight lifting when it previously may have 
functioned as a punishing stimulus for this same behavior. 
The function-altering account in effect describes an observable outcome of 
contingency specification. The mechanism by which this occurs has not been well 
developed by Schlinger and Blakely or by other writers who have discussed it 
(Cerutti, 1989; Vaughn, 1989). The literature on stimulus equivalence, however, 
provides an empirical preparation where function-altering has been directly 
observed and manipulated (Hayes & Hayes, 1989). 
Stimulus-equivalence research typically involves a matching-to-sample 
paradigm in which human subjects are trained to pick stimulus B in the presence 
of stimulus A and to pick stimulus C in the presence of stimulus A. Following 
such training, human subjects will pick stimulus C in the presence of stimulus B 
and vice versa even though they were never trained to do so. B now evokes the 
response to C and vice versa. The evocative functions of B and C have been 
altered as a result of such training. Furthermore, recent research has shown that 
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if stimulus C is established as a discriminative stimulus or a conditioned 
reinforcer, the other stimuli in the triad take on these functions without specific 
training (Hayes, Brownstein, Devany, Kohlenberg, & Shelby, 1987; Hayes, Tilley, 
& Hayes, 1988; Wulfert & Hayes, 1988; Kohlenberg, Hayes & Hayes, in press; 
Hayes, Kohlenberg, & Hayes, in press). 
Hayes and Hayes (1989) argue that the words in rules participate in 
equivalence classes with events in the natural environment and could alter the 
function of these events in a similar manner. They provide the following 
interpretation of the effects of the rule: "If the bell rings, then get the cake from 
the oven." The words bell, rings, get, cake, and oven participate in equivalence 
classes with actual bells, rings, the action of getting, cakes, and ovens. Because of 
the "equivalent" relationship between the words and actual events, functions 
established with respect to the words transfer to the actual events. 
The rule is in the form of an "if then" stimulus frame which has been 
reinforced as a generalized frame into which various objects and actions can be 
inserted (cf. Gewirtz & Stingle, 1968). For example, with direct reinforcement for 
use of various particulars of this frame such as: "If red then stop." or "If green 
then go." humans respond to novel combinations such as: "If blue then push fast." 
even if "blue" and "push fast" had never been presented in an "if then" frame. 
Presumably there would have to have been a history with respect to the words 
blue and push fast in other contexts. 
The if then frame also establishes a conditional relationship between the 
stimulus and the action. The functions of "getting the cake" are transferred to 
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"bell" and "ring" via this frame. Technically, we could say that the frame 
establishes the words bell and ring as conditional stimuli in the presence of which 
the oven is a discriminative stimulus for approach, and the cake a discriminative 
stimulus for getting. The participation of the actual words in classes with actual 
objects transfers these functions to the objects. 
Function-altering as a descriptive process offers several advantages in the 
analysis of the effects of rules. It appears to describe more aptly the effects of 
rules (Blakely & Schlinger, 1987, Cerutti, 1989) while still using a vocabulary 
consistent with behavior-analytic principles. Relating function-altering to stimulus 
equivalence brings a rapidly growing empirical literature to bear on this 
essentially theoretical analysis. The analyses by Hayes and Hayes (1989) further 
tie these two literatures together in a way that begins to make sense of what it 
means to specify a contingency, a concept which has had little scrutiny in past 
behavior-analytic theory and research. The promise for each of these ways of 
thinking is that they will eventually improve our ability to predict and control 
human behavior. 
Rules and Their Use as Consequences in Feedback 
The review thus far has focused on the theory and research that is relevant 
to control by verbal antecedents or rules. Although, comparatively little research 
and theory has focused on control by verbal consequences or feedback, it may be 
that much of what is known about verbal antecedents is generalizable to verbal 
consequences. In ongoing social interactions, rules are stated, and restated. If a 
rule is followed, the verbal community points this out; if a rule is not followed, a 
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corrective statement is given. This type of verbal shaping of control by rules is 
commonly referred to as feedback. 
Some practical examples of this type of feedback are as follows. A parent 
tells her child: 'Take your shoes off before you come in the house, so that the 
carpet won't get dirty." When the child enters the door and takes her shoes off, 
the parent gives the following feedback: "You remembered to take your shoes 
off. Good job. Because you did what you are told, you can go into the kitchen 
and get a cookie." 
The training that a beginning mechanic might receive provides another 
illustration. The beginning mechanic's behavior is often under the control of the 
rules specified in a repair manual. If the instructions are followed carefully, the 
car will be fixed. Instructors may note this explicitly in verbal consequences that 
are delivered, such as "You did a good job reading the specs. It runs great." 
These examples illustrate common uses of feedback ~ the use of a verbal 
consequence ~ to shape and strengthen behavior. In these examples, behavior 
evoked by a rule was followed by verbal feedback taking the form of a 
contingency-specifying stimulus. In the first example, the parent verbally noted 
appropriate rule-following and resultant socially-mediated consequences for it (the 
cookie). In the second, the instructor noted the relation between rule-following 
and the natural consequences that resulted (the car running well). 
What is especially noteworthy here is that the distinction between verbal 
antecedents and verbal consequences begins to blur when actual examples are 
considered. Verbal feedback often takes the form of a contingency-specifying 
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verbal formula. While there is little research in the human operant literature on 
verbal consequences, this similarity suggests that the research and theory on 
verbal antecedents might be relevant to the understanding of verbal consequences 
as well. 
In my earlier analysis of verbal antecedents I made three major points: 
a) Verbal rules often compete with direct contingencies for the control of 
behavior. 
b) Control by verbal antecedents may involve at least two different kinds of 
contingencies: social contingencies for rule-following per se or natural 
contingencies for behavior evoked by a rule. 
c) Rules may control behavior by altering the functions of other stimuli in 
the environment. 
Each of these three points seem to have relevance for ways in which verbal 
consequences may affect behavior. 
Competition Between Verbal Consequences and Other Contingencies 
Verbal antecedents can exert strong control over behavior often overriding 
control by other contingencies and verbal consequences may well do likewise. 
Verbal consequences that reinforce compliance with a rule may result in 
continued rule-following even when rule-following no longer results in 
programmed consequences. In addition, inaccurate feedback may control 
behavior much as inaccurate antecedent instructions do. 
The interaction between feedback and rules is also of interest. Feedback 
may act to augment already existing control exerted by antecedent stimuli, 
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resulting in a greater degree of correspondence between rules and behavior. 
Feedback may also establish correspondence between rules and behavior in 
situations where rules have shown no previous control. Conversely, some types of 
feedback may override contingencies supporting rule control and result in less 
correspondence between rules and behavior. 
Contingency Analyses of the Effects of Verbal Consequences 
The observed effects of verbal consequences may be amenable to a 
contingency-based analysis similar to those presented by Skinner (1969) and 
Zettle and Hayes (1982). The examples of the child and the mechanic illustrate 
how feedback may focus either on the correspondence between rules and behavior 
as related to socially mediated consequences (pliance) or the relationship between 
the correspondence between rules and behavior and the natural consequences 
(tracking). 
Both types of feedback specify a rule-behavior relation and may result in 
an increase in rule-following. However, on the one hand, feedback that specifies 
the relation between the achievement of direct consequences and rule-following 
might lead to subsequent control by direct consequences if the rule-behavior 
correspondence no longer results in the specified consequences. Conversely, 
feedback that specifies the relation between observed rule-behavior 
correspondence and the achievement of social consequences specifically meted out 
for this correspondence might lead to continued control by the rules, even if the 
rule-behavior correspondence no longer results in the delivery of some other 
direct consequence. 
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As will be seen later, this analysis of the direct contingencies that might be 
responsible for control by verbal consequences suggested a methodology for the 
current study. 
The Function-Altering Effects of Verbal Consequences 
Verbal consequences may also alter the functions of stimuli in the 
programmed or natural environment. For example, a parent might encourage a 
child to get a job doing yard work. The child returns announcing that she has 
charged $10 for her work. The parent then says: "I'm glad that you did what I 
asked but you should only have charged $5." This feedback might alter the 
reinforcing qualities of amounts over $5 for this kind of work. Receiving more 
money for the yard work may now have some aversive properties because more 
money would be associated with some increased probability of parental detection 
and correction. Verbal consequences may not just compete with other 
contingencies in a quantitative sense but may alter the qualitative nature of 
environmental events. By designing feedback that could possibly alter the 
function of programmed consequences, empirical methods could be brought to 
bear on the issue of function-altering. 
Summary of Introductory Review 
Common-sense examples suggest that verbal consequences may be very 
important in establishing control by antecedent verbal stimuli. While there has 
been considerable research and theorizing on rules as antecedent stimuli, the 
study of verbal consequences and their interaction with the control by antecedent 
verbal stimuli has been neglected. There are no published basic behavior-analytic 
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studies that have explicitly examined the effects of verbal feedback on the control 
exerted by rules. Because the use of verbal feedback appears to be as widespread 
as the use of instructions themselves, they should be. brought into the empirical 
base of research on instructional control. 
Verbal stimuli as consequences possess similarities to rules and may be 
different from verbal stimuli as antecedents only in their position in the behavior 
stream and in the functions that they possess (reinforcing versus discriminative). 
Research on antecedent verbal stimuli may have implications for how we look at 
consequential verbal stimuli. In particular, verbal consequences may involve both 
pliance and tracking-like contingencies and may affect behavior by changing the 
functions of other stimuli in the rule-followers environment. 
Statement of Purpose 
The primary goal of the present study was to explore how verbal 
consequences for rule-following interact with the control exerted by rules. As 
discussed above, the effects of rules have been studied extensively within the 
human operant research paradigm. The effects of verbal consequences for rule-
following have not yet been addressed in human operant research. Because of the 
scarcity of experimental research and formal theorizing concerning verbal 
consequences for rule-following, the study was exploratory in nature. It was 
neither designed to test a particular theory nor to resolve a theoretical debate. 
The aim of this study was to bring empirical methods to bear on a neglected but 
seemingly influential variable that may affect the control exerted by rules. 
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Experimental Setting 
In the experiment reported here, subjects worked on a task involving a 
multiple schedule of reinforcement with points exchangeable for chances at a cash 
prize as the programmed consequences. Each time a point was delivered, the 
subjects were also told how many points they had earned thus far. In the 
beginning of the session, the subjects were given a rule that specified the actual 
schedules of reinforcement. At a later point in the experiment, the schedules 
changed without the subject being notified. One schedule change enabled 
subjects to greatly increase point earnings or effectiveness with respect to 
maximum consequence delivery and another enabled the subject to respond at a 
lower response rate with no change in point earning thus increasing efficiency. In 
previous research (Hayes et al., 1986a, 1986b), similar preparations have been 
used to study the effects of rules on the sensitivity to changes in schedules of 
reinforcement. In this study, verbal consequences were interjected as a means of 
further impacting the subject's response to the schedule changes. The interactions 
between rules, programmed contingencies and verbal consequences was observed. 
Types of Verbal Consequences for Rule-Following 
Two types of verbal consequences were chosen for study: rule-following 
feedback and rule-following feedback plus task performance feedback. The actual 
form of these consequences and the rationale for their choice are presented 
below. 
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Rule-Following Feedback. Rule-following feedback specified the 
correspondence between the subject's behavior and the behavior that was 
specified in the antecedent rule. In the present experiment, it took the following 
form: "You are (not) following the rule that you were given at the beginning of 
the session." 
There are at least two reasons to study rule-following feedback as a type of 
verbal consequence. First, since I was primarily interested in the relation between 
verbal consequences and rule-following, it seemed logical to manipulate the 
presence or absence of verbal consequences that addressed rule compliance. 
Second, rule-following feedback may be a means to manipulate some of the 
contingencies that support rule-following. The direct manipulation of 
contingencies supporting rule-following addressed a key theoretical issue. Several 
accounts of rule-induced "insensitivity" to programmed contingencies have 
suggested the presence of collateral contingencies that support compliance with 
rules (Catania, Shimoff, & Matthews, 1989; Cerutti, 1989; Skinner, 1969; Zettle & 
Hayes, 1982). These collateral contingencies have been relegated to inferred 
reinforcement histories and have themselves received little direct study. It seems 
appropriate for the study of verbal consequences to address this key issue early 
on. This is especially relevant given that observation of the use of verbal 
consequences in everyday life suggests that they may be quite frequently used to 
shape and maintain control by rules. 
Rule-Following Feedback Plus Task Performance Feedback. The second 
type of feedback involved feedback on rule-following identical to the first type of 
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feedback. In addition, subjects were also given feedback on task performance or 
how many points they had earned. In the present experiment, this type of 
consequence took the following form: "You are (not) following the rule that you 
were given at the beginning of the session. You earned X point(s) in the last two 
minutes." 
The combination of feedback for rule-following and task performance 
seemed to be a logical step. In research on rule-governance, antecedents rules 
are usually pitted against the direct task performance contingencies. This second 
type of verbal consequence looks at both of these dimensions in verbal 
consequential form. The subject is given feedback on rule-following as well as the 
programmed consequences associated with rule-following. 
Task performance feedback has not previously been studied in this way. 
Verbal task performance consequences can be immediate or delayed. 
The points used in this study are an example of immediate feedback. They 
can also be conceptualized as verbal consequences given the fact that there 
reinforcing value is verbally established by orienting instructions. In fact these 
points are often nothing but words and are exchangeable for nothing. Even when 
the task consequences are not directly established by verbal behavior, verbal 
accompaniments seem highly likely. For example, a child shooting down a plane 
in a video game may see the plane explode, but may say to himself "I shot him." 
It would be difficult to devise task performance feedback for adults that would be 
completely non-verbal. In this sense, most human operant studies involve verbal 
task performance feedback to the extent that they employ consequences whose 
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value is established by verbal description. However, as stated above, this 
feedback has been immediate as opposed to delayed summative feedback. While 
both seem important, the present study focused more on delayed, summative 
forms of task performance feedback. 
The verbal summative type of feedback seems more relevant to how 
feedback is used in applied settings. What is traditionally called feedback in 
applied behavioral research conducted in industrial settings (see Rapp, 
Carstensen, & Prue, 1983 for a review of this literature), amounts to a verbal 
summation of behavior or behavior products administered well after the behavior 
has occurred. For example, feedback has taken the form of oral and written 
tallies of safety violations. Such feedback in conjunction with suggestions for 
remediation has been shown to significantly reduce safety violations (Sulzer-
Azaroff & de Santamaria, 1980). Another example is provided by feedback that 
summarizes the consequences of production, in this case, the number of rosin bags 
that were made by factory workers. This feedback was shown to increase the 
amount of time that machines were running during the day (Frost, Hopkins, & 
Conrad, 1981). 
These examples indicate the applied relevance of verbal consequences that 
provide a summation of performance. What is missing in the applied literature is 
a more precise analysis of the relationships among rules, rule-following feedback, 
and feedback on task performance. The human operant laboratory provides a 
precise setting for the study of this phenomenon as compared to industrial settings 
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which are fraught with social complexities and other types of competing 
contingencies. 
The Accuracy of Verbal Consequences 
Both of the types of feedback described above can involve a dependent or 
contingent relationship between the consequence and the subjects' behavior. 
Positive or negative feedback can be based on the subjects' behavior with respect 
to the rule. However, it is not clear whether verbal consequences truly function 
as consequences, or as a special type of antecedent. Recall that verbal 
antecedents often induce insensitivity regardless of their accuracy. The mere 
presence of verbal consequences for rule-following may enhance rule-following 
regardless of accuracy. The necessity of accuracy was studied in the following 
manner. Some of the subjects receiving the types of feedback discussed above 
were always told that they were following the rule regardless of their actual 
behavior. If the actual contingency between rule-following and rule-following 
feedback is not important, then there should be no difference in the effect of the 
messages when they are dependent or nondependent - accurate or inaccurate. 
Examining this dependency factor helps to explore how verbal feedback actually 
works. 
Control Conditions 
Two control conditions were also included in the experiment. Some 
subjects received no rule and no feedback, and others received a rule without 
feedback. These control groups established a baseline of rule-induced insensitivity 
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to changing contingencies as well as contingency control in the absence of a 
specific rule. 
Possible Effects of the Two Types of Feedback 
It seems likely that rule-following feedback alone may increase insensitivity 
to changes in programmed contingencies in situations where the rule is 
incongruent with maximum effectiveness or efficiency with respect to the 
programmed contingency. Such an effect could be easily interpreted by appealing 
to the notion of competing collateral contingencies. Programmed contingencies 
support behavior that meets the requirement for delivery of the programmed 
consequence. In my procedure, rule-following ultimately led to decreased 
effectiveness or decreased response efficiency with respect to the programmed 
consequences. Positive feedback for rule-following and negative feedback for 
rule-breaking could further support behavior that is not effective in terms of the 
programmed contingencies. Given that rules alone often effectively compete with 
programmed contingencies, the addition of rule-following feedback is likely to 
further enhance rule-following. 
The possible effect of the combination of feedback on rule-following and 
task performance is more difficult to predict than the effects of feedback on rule-
following alone. On the one hand, task performance feedback in the context of 
rule-following feedback could reduce any increase in rule-following produced by 
rule-following feedback. Subjects may better note the relation between following 
or not following the rule and increased or decreased point delivery. Because in 
my procedure rule-following ultimately led to decreased points or decreased 
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response efficiency, such a relation could reduce rule-following. Essentially, it 
may alter the nature of rule-following from a socially-mediated end in itself to a 
means to an end in the natural world. 
From the standpoint of a competing contingency analysis, this manipulation 
may increase the effectiveness of the programmed consequences by specifying that 
rules no longer lead to effective action. Such a finding would be of interest in 
that it would point to ways that rules could be used to establish effective 
responding that would be sensitive to any subsequent changes in effectiveness. 
However, task performance feedback in the context of rule-following 
feedback could increase rule-induced insensitivity still further, if the points are 
taken to be indications of following or not following the rule. That is, rule-
following feedback plus task performance feedback could alter the functions of 
points from desirable consequences to indications of rule-breakage. Such an 
effect would be difficult to account for in terms of a simple competing 





Subjects were undergraduate and graduate students at the University of 
Nevada-Reno. They were recruited using three procedures: 1) students in 
introductory psychology classes signed up for the experiment as a means of 
fulfilling course requirements or obtaining extra credit; 2) signs were posted on 
campus to solicit volunteers who were interested in participating in a psychology 
experiment concerned with human learning; and 3) the principal investigator 
visited psychology classes to solicit volunteers. 
Ninety-nine subjects completed the experiment. The data from 60 subjects 
met the criteria for inclusion in the study, making for a total of ten subjects in 
each experimental group. Of these 60 subjects, 39 were female and 21 were male. 
Their ages ranged from 15 to 50 with a mean age of 23. Subjects were randomly 
assigned to the experimental groups as a means of controlling for bias due to age, 
gender, or other factors. 
Setting and Apparatus 
The experiment was conducted in a small laboratory room containing a 
chair, table, and the experimental apparatus. The apparatus included a 
microcomputer with a CGA monitor. Two telegraph keys mounted on a wooden 
platform were wired to the joystick port at the rear of the computer. 
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Experimental Task 
A five-by-five matrix with a circle in the upper left-hand corner appeared 
on the monitor. The matrix comprised 25, 4-cm by 3.5-cm squares. Below the 
grid, either a blue or red 4.5-cm by 1.5 cm rectangle was illuminated. The blue 
rectangle appeared below the left half of the matrix and the red rectangle 
appeared below the right half of the matrix. Only one rectangle was presented at 
any given time. A wooden platform with two telegraph keys was located directly 
in front of the monitor. 
According to a programmed schedule, presses on the left button moved 
the circle down one square, while presses on the right button moved the circle 
one square to the right. If the circle was moved more than five squares down or 
five squares to the right, it reset to the upper-left hand corner. If the circle 
reached the lower right-hand corner, a message on the screen instructed the 
subject to press either button in order to receive a point. The screen then 
displayed the total number of points that had been earned for that session and the 
circle was reset to the upper left hand corner. 
Procedure 
At the beginning of the experiment, the subject was read the following 
instructions: 
Please read these instructions with me as I read them out loud. This is an 
experiment in learning, not a psychological test. We are interested in 
certain aspects of the learning process which are common to all people. 
During the experiment, you will be alone in this room for approximately 96 
minutes. The experiment will begin when a five by five grid appears on 
the monitor. When the experiment is over, the monitor will say so. 
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When the grid appears, there will be a circle in the upper left-hand corner. 
To make points, move the circle to the lower right-hand corner; then when 
the monitor says to, push either button to receive your point. Try to see 
how many points you can get. Each point is worth a chance at two $20.00 
prizes to be given at the end of the semester. 
Moving the circle to the lower right-hand corner involves the buttons and 
the lights. 
When the blue rectangle is lit, the best way to push the buttons is slowly 
with several seconds between each push. When the red rectangle is lit, the 
best way to push the buttons is rapidly. 
Please do not push both buttons at the same time during the task. If you 
have any questions, ask them now, because during the experiment the 
experimenter will not be able to answer any questions. 
The subject was then asked to sign the consent form (see Appendix A). 
Any questions were answered by rereading the relevant portion of the instructions. 
The experimenter then left the room and the experiment began. 
Subjects worked individually for one 96-minute session. Movement of the 
circle was programmed according to two different multiple schedules of 
reinforcement. One multiple schedule was in effect during the first 32 minutes of 
the experiment and a second multiple schedule was in effect for the final 64 
minutes of the experiment. The change from one schedule to another was not 
signalled. 
First Multiple Schedule 
During the first 32 minutes of the experiment (Phase 1), movement of the 
circle using the telegraph keys was programmed according to a multiple 
differential reinforcement of low rate 6 seconds (DRL 6)/fixed ratio 18 (FR 18) 
schedule of reinforcement. When the blue rectangle appeared at the bottom of 
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the matrix, presses on the buttons moved the circle in accordance with a DRL 6 
schedule of reinforcement: each press following a six-second period without a 
press resulted in a movement. A press following a pause of less than six seconds 
resulted in the timer being reset. Very low rates of responding maximized point 
delivery in this schedule. When the red rectangle appeared, presses on the button 
moved the circle in accordance with a FR 18 schedule of reinforcement. A 
movement occurred following the 18th response on either button. The direction 
of movement was determined by the particular button pressed. High rates of 
responding maximized point delivery in this schedule. The color of the light and 
thus the schedule of reinforcement switched every two minutes. 
Inclusion Criteria. Of particular interest in this study was the interaction 
between control by antecedent rules and control by verbal consequences. 
Therefore it was critical that each subject showed behavior consistent with the 
rule during acquisition and before feedback on rule-following began. Only 
subjects who earned at least one point in each of the two initial schedules during 
the first 20 minutes of the experiment were included in the study. Verbal 
feedback began after 20 minutes. Thirty nine subjects who began the experiment 
did not meet the criteria for inclusion. 
Second Multiple Schedule 
Following 32 minutes of exposure to the first multiple schedule, the 
schedule was switched to a multiple fixed ratio 1 (FR l)/fixed interval yoked (FI 
Yoked) schedule of reinforcement that remained in effect for the final 64 minutes 
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of the experiment. The change in schedules was not announced or signalled in 
any way. 
When the blue rectangle previously associated with the DRL 6 schedule 
was present, presses on the buttons moved the circle in accordance with a FR 1 
schedule of reinforcement. Each press on the button resulted in a movement of 
the circle. High rates of responding maximized point delivery in this schedule. 
When the red rectangle previously associated with the FR 18 schedule 
appeared, the circle moved according to a FT yoked schedule, which was 
individualized for each subject. The interval value was calculated by determining 
the average number of seconds that it took the subject to respond 18 times and 
move the circle in the last two-minute phase of the FR 18. For example, if a 
subject responded 432 times in the last two-minute FR 18 component, his or her 
interval value would be five seconds. In a FI 5 schedule, the first press on the 
button after five seconds elapsed resulted in a movement of the circle. Presses 
occurring in the interval before five seconds elapsed produced no effect. In this 
schedule, lower rates of responding than that previously seen in the FR 18 
schedule would generate the same number of points. 
If the subject showed no response rate changes under the two schedules in 
the last 64 minutes as compared to the first 32 minutes, the circle would move in 
almost exactly the same way and earn the same amount of points. However, 
following the switch from the DRL 6 to the FR 1, an increase in response rate 
resulted in a substantial increase in movement of the circle and the delivery of 
points. Thus a large increase in the effectiveness of responding was possible. 
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When the schedule switched from the FR 18 to the FI Yoked, the subject could 
show a substantial decrease in response rate without reducing the number of 
movements of the circle or the number of points delivered. In addition, the 
number of movements or points could not be increased. Thus an increase in 
efficiency but not effectiveness was possible. 
Rule Messages 
During the first 20 minutes of the experiment, each switch between 
components of the multiple schedule was marked by a four second pause during 
which the screen went blank. For the next 44 minutes, switches between the 
components of the multiple schedule were marked by a four second message 
which gave feedback on rule-following. The form of the message was different for 
each experimental group, with two groups receiving no messages throughout the 
entire experiment. The groups who received no messages continued to receive 
the four seconds of blank screen between components. In the final 32 minutes of 
the experiment (Phase 3), no messages were presented between components of 
the multiple schedule. All subjects received a blank screen for four seconds in the 
time period between alternating components of the multiple schedule. The 32 
minute period of time beginning with the schedule transition and ending with the 
cessation of rule-messages was referred to as Phase 2. 
Types of Rule-Messages. The first type of rule-message was referred to as 
rule-following feedback because it stated whether or not the subject was emitting 
behavior that was in correspondence with the original rule (fast response rates 
when the red rectangle was present and slow response rates when the blue 
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rectangle was present). This message took the form: "You are (not) following the 
rule that you were given at the beginning of the session". 
The second type of message was referred to as rule-following point 
feedback as it gave feedback on the number of the specified consequences 
(points) that the subject had earned, within the context of rule-following feedback. 
This type of message took the form: "You are (not) following the rule that your 
were given at the beginning of the session. You earned X point(s) in the last two 
minutes." 
Dependence of Rule-Messages. Both types of rule-messages presented 
feedback as to whether or not the subjects' behavior was in correspondence to the 
behavior that was specified in the rule. This feedback was either dependent or 
independent of the subjects' actual performance on the task. 
In the dependent condition, the rule-following feedback was dependent on 
the subjects' actual behavior. If subjects responded 30 times or less in two 
minutes when the blue rectangle was present (DRL 6 and FR 1 schedules), they 
were told that they were following the rule that was given at the beginning of the 
experiment. If subjects responded more than 30 times in two minutes when the 
blue rectangle was present, they were told that they were not following the rule. 
When the red rectangle was present (FR 18 or FI yoked schedules), subjects who 
responded more than 100 times in two minutes were told that they were following 
the rule and subjects who responded 100 times or less were told that they were 
not following the rules. 
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In the nondependent condition, the subjects were always told that they 
were following the rules regardless of their performance. Nondependence 
specifically refers to a consistent delivery of positive feedback as opposed to the 
delivery of positive and negative feedback based on a random schedule 
independent of performance. 
Presentation of Rule Messages. Rule messages were introduced 20 
minutes after the experiment began. This allowed all subjects to acquire the 
response under the influence of the rule alone. The messages were introduced 12 
minutes before the unannounced change in schedules. Staggering these changes 
avoided associating the schedule change with a salient change such as the addition 
of rule messages. Pairing these two manipulations may have inadvertently called 
attention to the schedule change and made it easier to detect. 
Control Conditions 
There were two control conditions in this experiment. These groups 
received no rule messages. A blank screen was always displayed for four seconds 
between the two-minute schedule components. 
The Rule Alone Group received the standard rule at the beginning of the 
experiment but received no rule-following feedback during the course of the 
experiment. 
The Minimal Rule Group received minimal instructions as opposed to the 
more specific instructions received by the preceding groups. No rule messages 
were presented. The instructions were the same as those given to the other 
subjects with the exception of the omission of the following section: 
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When the blue rectangle is lit, the best way to push the buttons is 
slowly with several seconds between each push. When the red 
rectangle is lit the best way to push the buttons is rapidly. 
Debriefing 
Following the experiment, the subjects were given a debriefing statement 
(Appendix B) and the experimenter answered any questions that were raised. 
Experimental Design 
The experimental design can be represented as a 2 (rule-message) by 2 
(dependence) factorial design with two control groups. In one control group the 
subjects received the standard antecedent rule but did not receive rule-following 
feedback messages of any kind. This allows for the evaluation of the effects of 
verbal consequences on rule-following, above and beyond the effects of rules 
alone. The other control group received minimal instructions. A comparison 
between the groups receiving rules alone and the groups receiving minimal 
instructions would reveal the effects of rules alone. By crossing the two types of 
rule messages and two types of correspondence, and adding appropriate control 
groups, six experimental groups are formed. These groups also be represented as 
a single-factor design. The six groups are as follows: 
1. Rule-Following Dependent (n=l(V>. 
2. Rule-Following Nondependent (n=l(T>. 
3. Rule-Following Point Dependent (n=10V 
4. Rule-Following Point Nondependent (n=10\ 
5. Rule Alone (n=10Y 




Of primary interest in this study were changes in subjects' behavior in 
response to transitions from the first multiple schedule to the second multiple 
schedule and the withdrawal of the feedback on rule-following. At the onset of 
Phase 2, the schedules of reinforcement were changed from a FR 18 to a FI 
Yoked and from a DRL 6 to a FR 1. 
The two basic schedule transitions seem to involve different consequential 
dimensions. Sensitivity to the change from the FR 18 to the FI Yoked is a matter 
of increased efficiency of responding. A subject who is responding at a high rate 
in the FR 18 schedule and earning a substantial number of points can greatly 
decrease her rate of responding and still earn the same number of points in the 
Fl Yoked schedule. High and low response rates earn the same number of points 
in a two-minute period. However, the low response rate is more efficient in terms 
of the number of responses it takes to receive a point. 
Sensitivity to the change from a DRL 6 to the FR 1 is a matter of 
increased effectiveness of responding. A subject who is responding with low rates 
in the DRL 6 and earning the maximum number of points can increase her rate 
of responding and earn many more points in the FR 1. Continued low response 
rates result in no change in the number of points earned while a change to a 
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higher response rate results in a much higher number of points earned. The high 
response rate is more effective in terms of earning points. 
Sensitivity to schedule changes that permit greater efficiency of responding 
and sensitivity to schedule changes which permit greater response effectiveness 
may be affected by different variables. For this reason, the findings for the 
efficiency-based transition and the effectiveness-based transition were analyzed 
separately. 
Data Analysis 
The number of responses and points earned per two-minute component 
was the principal dependent measure. Of particular interest is the average 
number of responses and points per two-minute component in each phase across 
the six experimental groups. Recall that for the first 32 minutes (Phase 1) the 
initial schedules of reinforcement were in effect. In the groups that received rule 
messages, the messages began after 20 minutes had elapsed in Phase 1. For the 
second 32 minutes (Phase 2) the schedules were changed and remained the same 
for the remainder of the experiment. Rule messages continued to be presented 
throughout all of Phase 2. For the final 32 minutes of the experiment (Phase 3), 
the rule messages, in groups that received them were withdrawn. The second 
multiple schedule remained in effect in Phase 3. 
The mean number of responses and points per two-minute component was 
computed for Phase 1 (using the three components of each schedule prior to the 
schedule change), Phase 2 (using the eight components in each schedule after the 
schedule change), and Phase 3 (using the eight components in each schedule 
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following the withdrawal of the rule-messages). The final three components were 
used in Phase 1 to help insure relatively stable responding and point earning, 
since the first few components showed highly variable responding due to task 
acquisition. 
The experimental design was conceptualized in two different ways. One 
conceptualization consisted of a series of single-factor designs. There were six 
groups that were each exposed to three phases. Three separate one-way analyses 
of variance (ANOVAs) were computed to examine differences in group 
performance during each experimental phase. A repeated-measures design could 
not be used because of the violation of the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance across the three phases. Thus a set of analyses were also computed 
using difference scores to examine changes between phases. 
The design was also conceptualized as a two (rule message type) by two 
(dependence) factorial design. Conceptualized in this fashion, the Minimal Rule 
Group and the Rule Alone Group were external control groups not included in 
the main analysis. The two-way ANOVA was used to determine the effects of 
rule message and dependence and the interaction of these variables. A separate 
analysis was conducted for each phase. Once again, the two-way analyses were 
conducted both on mean number of responses and points per component in each 
phase and on differences scores from phase to phase. 
These two conceptualizations explored both differences between groups 
and effects of variables common to more than one group, during task acquisition 
(Phase 1), following a schedule change (Phase 2) and following withdrawal of 
47 
rule-messages (Phase 3). Performance in each phase and changes from one phase 
to another (difference score analyses) were examined. In all inferential statistical 
analyses a p value of 0.05 was considered to be statistically significant. 
Efficiencv-Based Transition 
Parametric Analysis of Response Rate Data 
The efficiency-based transition began with a FR 18 schedule of 
reinforcement in Phase 1. A one-way (group) ANOVA (See Table 1; Table 1 and 
all subsequent tables are located in Appendix C) was computed to compare mean 
number of responses per component across the six groups in Phase 1. No 
significant differences (F(5,54) = 0.39, g = ns) were found among the six groups 
in Phase 1. The mean number of responses per two minutes in Phase 1, across 
the six groups, was 488.6. These findings indicated that there were no major 
differences in schedule acquisition across the six groups. 
The second phase marked the introductions of the FT Yoked schedule of 
reinforcement. A one-way (group) ANOVA (See Table 1) was computed to 
compare mean number of responses per component across the six groups in Phase 
2. No significant difference (F(5,54) = 0.47, g = ns) was found between the six 
groups in Phase 2. The mean number of responses per two minutes in Phase 2 
across the six groups was 333.8, about 155 responses fewer than in Phase 1. Thus, 
subjects in the six groups responded uniformly to the change to the FT Yoked 
schedule of reinforcement in Phase 2. The different types of feedback did not 
produce a differential response to an efficiency-based change in the schedule of 
reinforcement. 
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The third phase marked the withdrawal of the rule messages and a 
continuance of the FT Yoked schedule of reinforcement. A one-way (group) 
ANOVA (See Table 1) was computed to compare mean number of responses per 
component across the six groups in Phase 3. Once again, no significant 
differences (£(5,54) = 0.32, g = ns) were found between the six groups in Phase 
3. Responding showed a further decline, with the mean number of responses per 
two minutes in Phase 3, across the six groups, being 250.5. The withdrawal of the 
rule messages did not have a differential effect on response rate across the six 
groups. 
Two-way (rule message x dependence) ANOVAs were computed to assess 
differential influence of the type of rule message and whether or not the rule 
messages were dependent on actual responding. The Minimal Rule Group and 
the Rule Alone Group were excluded from these analyses. A separate analysis 
was computed for each of the three phases. As might be expected, given the 
results of the one-way analyses, there were no significant differences in the mean 
number of responses per component between the two types of rule-following 
feedback, the two types of feedback dependencies, or their interaction in any of 
the three phases (see Table 2). Thus, either alone or in combination, neither the 
rule messages nor the type of dependency had any effect on acquisition, post 
schedule transition responding, or post rule message withdrawal responding when 
the schedule change afforded only increased response efficiency. 
In addition to examining the differences in mean number of responses per 
group per phase, difference scores were computed for each group. The difference 
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in the mean number of response per component between phases was computed 
for each subject. This gave rise to three difference scores: the difference between 
Phase 2 and Phase 1 (D21), the difference between Phase 3 and Phase 2 (D32), 
and the difference between Phase 3 and Phase 1 (D31). These scores enabled the 
study of possible divergence in the mean difference in the number of responses 
from phase to phase across groups. None of the one-way or two-way ANOVAs 
was statistically significant for any of the three difference score measures (see 
Tables 3 & 4). 
Nonparametric Analyses 
The data were also analyzed in a nonparametric fashion. Pilot work 
suggested that two specific patterns indicated insensitivity to change from the FR 
18 to the FI Yoked schedule of reinforcement. One pattern was typified as a 
steady continuation of the previous pattern or a failure to show dramatic change. 
Operationally, this was defined as a failure to go below 100 responses in any of 
the eight components in Phase 2. A second pattern was typified as a decrease in 
response rate below the criterion followed by a return to above criterion response 
rate. Operationally this was defined as a decrease below 100 and return to above 
100 in any of the eight components in Phase 2. A cutoff of 100 responses was 
chosen because it was also the cutoff between receiving a positive versus a 
negative rule-following message in the dependent groups. In none of the groups 
were fewer than eight out of ten subjects insensitive to the efficiency-based 
transition based on the criteria described above. The number of subjects in each 
of the six groups showing insensitivity and sensitivity formed the basis for a Chi-
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square table (see Table 5). No significant difference was found (Chi-Square 
=2.39 12 = ns). A similar table was constructed for the number of subjects 
showing the defined insensitivity patterns versus subjects showing the defined 
sensitivity pattern in Phase 3 (See Table 5). No significant difference was found 
(Chi-Square = 1.41 g = ns). These results suggest that subjects, regardless of 
group, were uniformly insensitive to the efficiency-based transition. 
The results of from the nonparametric analysis are consistent with those of 
the parametric analyses. Overall, the independent variables showed no 
differential effects on the response to the transition from a FR 18 to a FT Yoked 
schedule of reinforcement or to the subsequent withdrawal of rule messages. 
Parametric Analysis of Point Data 
In addition to the response rate data, the mean number of points earned 
per component was calculated for each phase. Identical analyses were computed 
for the point data as were done for the response rate data. No significant effects 
were found (see Tables 6, 7, 8, & 9). 
Point of Contact With the Schedule Change 
Sensitivity to programmed contingencies can be assessed in more than one 
way. Response rate is one global measure of schedule sensitivity. Looking at 
response rate alone does not indicate if contact with the contingencies was 
actually made at a more molecular level. For example, a subject still showing 300 
responses per two-minute component following the shift from the FR 18 to the FI 
Yoked schedule of reinforcement may have some instances of long interresponse 
times in a given component, thus showing evidence of having contacted the 
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schedule change. However, looking only at the number of responses per 
component would suggest that this subject did not contact the change. Contact 
with a change in contingencies can also be operationally defined in terms of the 
amount of time between responses. Interresponse times are a more precise 
indicant of contact with the contingencies. 
Recall that the FI value was individually determined for each subject in 
that it was yoked to response rates in the latter part of Phase 1. The mean FI 
Yoked value across the six groups was 4.61 seconds. A one-way (group) ANOVA 
showed no significant differences (F(5,54) = .31, g = ns) in the mean FI Yoked 
values across the six groups (See Table 10). 
For the FR 18/FI Yoked schedule of reinforcement, the computer 
recorded each time the interresponse time was more than four seconds. Four 
seconds was chosen because it approximated the average interval value across 
subjects for the FI Yoked and provided a more precise indicator of when subjects 
showed evidence of schedule control. There were 24 components in the FR 18/FI 
Yoked schedule. After the eighth component, the schedule was changed. 
Response times of greater than four seconds during the two-minute components 
following the change from the first to the second multiple schedule were of 
particular interest. The first component after the change in multiple schedules 
change in which the subject showed one, four, and eight IRTs of greater than 
four seconds were recorded for each subject. The values of one, four, and eight 
were chosen because they indicated when the first point of contact occurred (one 
time), when the subject had contacted the change enough times to possibly move 
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the circle through half of the grid (four times), and through the entire grid, thus 
earning a point (eight times). 
A one-way ANOVA (group) was computed to analyze between-group 
differences in the mean component during which one, four, or eight IRTs of more 
than four seconds were shown. There were no significant differences between 
groups in terms of these dependent measures (See Table 11). On average, the 
subjects showed one IRT of greater than four seconds during the 13th component 
(13.3), four IRTs during the 16th component (15.6), and eight IRTs during the 
18th component (18.4). This indicates that subjects showed the first evidence of 
contact five components after the schedule change and with little evidence of 
stronger contact until after the end of the second phase. 
IRTs are a more precise measure of point of contact than observation of 
average response rate change following the schedule change. Failure to show 
sensitivity to contingencies can be due to the fact that response variability is often 
restricted by instructions (Joyce & Chase, 1990). Thus contact with the 
contingencies is not made until variable responding occurs. Failure to show 
sensitivity may also be due to other contingencies in addition to the programmed 
contingencies. Instructed subjects who have actually made contact with 
contingencies can still appear insensitive to these contingencies (Hayes et al., 
1986b). It is conceivable that a subject can show contact based on IRTs and still 
appear insensitive in terms of response rate (see results for the effectiveness-
based transition as an examples of this effect). 
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The relationship between the two measures of sensitivity warrants some 
empirical scrutiny. To further assess how these two measures of sensitivity relate 
to each other, correlations were computed between the three point of contact 
measures (one, four, and eight IRTs) and the average mean number of responses 
per component during the second and third phase. 
There was a consistent significant positive correlation between the mean 
number of responses in Phase 2 and the component number in Phase 2 or 3, at 
which the subject accumulated one (r = 0.63, g = 0.0001), four (r = 0.64, = 
0.0001), and eight (r = 0.58, £ = 0.0001) interresponse times of more than four 
seconds. This suggests that the higher the observed response rate in Phase 2, the 
later the point of contact was made. Overall, response rate and point of contact 
were two measures of insensitivity that were correlated with each other. It would 
be difficult to tell if any possible differences in response rate were due to 
differences in point of contact or to differences in the maintenance of response 
patterns once the changed contingencies had been contacted. It would therefore 
be of interest to look specifically at maintenance effects separately from point of 
contact effects. 
To study this issue further, the analyses conducted with respect to response 
rate were also conducted with point of contact as the covariate. Analyses of 
covariance (ANACOVAR) were conducted to assess differences across groups in 
terms of average number of responses in Phases 2 and 3 (after the schedule 
change), and difference scores from Phase 1 to 2, from Phase 2 to 3, and from 
Phase 1 to 3. There were no significant differences between groups in terms of 
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these dependent measures (see Tables 12 & 14). In addition there were no 
significant differences when two-way ANACOVARs (rule message type x 
dependence) were conducted with response rate and difference scores as the 
dependent measures (see Tables 13 & 15). 
These results suggest that the results of the parametric analyses on 
response rate ~ when controlling for point of contact as a covariate ~ are no 
different than the results of the analyses that do not control for point of contact 
as a covariate. This conclusion is specific for a schedule change that enabled a 
possible increase in efficiency. 
Effectiveness-Based Transition 
In the effectiveness-based transition a DRL 6 schedule of reinforcement 
was in effect for the first 32 minutes of the experiment (Phase 1). Following this 
phase, the schedule was changed to a FR 1 schedule of reinforcement which 
remained in effect for the remainder of the experiment. In the final 32 minutes, 
the rule-messages were withdrawn. 
Parametric Analysis of Response Rate Data 
The data analysis procedures for the effectiveness-based transition were 
identical to those conducted with the efficiency-based transition. Group 
differences in mean number of responses per component were examined for each 
phase. 
A one-way (group) ANOVA was computed to compare mean number of 
responses per component across the six groups in Phase 1 (see Table 16). A 
significant difference (F(5,54) = 3.36, j> < 0.02) was found between the six groups 
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in Phase 1. A Tukey test was computed to determine if there were significant 
differences between the individual groups. There was no significant difference 
among the Rule-Following Dependent Group (24.6), the Rule Alone Group 
(20.2), the Rule-Following Point Dependent Group (17.3), the Rule-Following 
Point Nondependent Group (17.0), and the Rule-Following Nondependent Group 
(16.5). The Minimal Rule Group showed the highest mean number of responses 
per component at 31.3 and was significantly higher than the Rule Alone Group, 
the Rule-Following Point Dependent Group, the Rule-Following Point 
Nondependent Group, and the Rule-Following Nondependent Group. There was 
no significant difference between the Minimal Rule group and the Rule-Following 
Dependent Group. This analysis reflects between-group differences in acquisition 
prior to the schedule change. Subjects in the Minimal Rule Group, with no rule 
to specify effective performance, tended to respond at a higher rate than 
necessary for the schedule requirements. The data also suggest a similar but less 
pronounced trend in the Rule-Following Dependent Group. However, analyses 
presented in a later section indicate that all groups earned a similar amount of 
points in Phase 1. These differences in response rate do not represent significant 
functional differences. 
Phase 2 began with the introduction of the FR 1 schedule of 
reinforcement. A one-way (group) ANOVA was computed to compare mean 
number of responses per component across the six groups in Phase 2 (see Table 
16). A significant difference (F(5,54) = 2.55, g < 0.05) was found between the six 
groups in Phase 2. A Tukey test was computed to determine if there were 
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significant differences between the pairs of individual groups. The Minimal Rule 
Group (202.1) was not significantly different from the Rule-Following 
Nondependent Group (178.6), the Rule Alone Group (173.9), the Rule-Following 
Point Nondependent (154.2) or the Rule-Following Dependent Group (147.7). 
The Rule-Following Point Dependent Group (87.7) was not significantly different 
from the Rule-Following Nondependent Group, the Rule Alone Group, the Rule-
Following Point Nondependent and the Rule-Following Dependent Group. The 
Rule-Following Point Dependent Group was the only group to differ significantly 
from the Minimal Rule Group. The Rule-Following Point Dependent Group had 
a lower mean number of responses per component than the other five groups. 
The Rule-Following Point Dependent manipulation seemed to induce somewhat 
higher degrees of insensitivity to the effectiveness-based schedule change than the 
other five groups. 
Phase 3 marks the withdrawal of the rule messages with a continued FR 1 
schedule of reinforcement. A one-way (group) ANOVA was computed to 
compare mean number of responses per component across the six groups in Phase 
3 (see Table 16). A significant difference (E(5,54) = 3.35, g = 0.02) was found 
between the six groups in Phase 3. A Tukey test was computed to determine 
significant differences between the pairs of individual groups. The Minimal Rule 
Group (253.1) was not significantly different from the Rule Alone Group (215.8), 
Rule-Following Point Nondependent Group (211.2), the Rule-Following 
Nondependent Group (210.6) or the Rule-Following Dependent Group (203.9). 
The Rule-Following Point Dependent Group (123.7) was not significantly different 
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from the Rule Alone Group, Rule-Following Point Nondependent Group, the 
Rule-Following Nondependent Group and the Rule-Following Dependent Group. 
The Rule-Following Point Dependent Group was the only group to be 
significantly different from the Minimal Rule Group. The Rule-Following Point 
Dependent Group had the lowest mean number of responses per component. 
The Rule-Following Point Dependent manipulation seemed to induce somewhat 
higher degrees of insensitivity to the FR1 schedule of reinforcement even after the 
rule messages had been withdrawn. 
A separate two-way (rule message x dependence) ANOVA was computed 
on data from each phase to assess differential influence of the type of rule 
message and rule message dependency. There were no significant differences in 
any of these analyses (see Table 17). Taken together, these results suggest that 
rule message type and dependence do not have differential effects on the subjects' 
adaptation to the effectiveness-based transition or response to rule message 
withdrawal when compared to each other, but certain combinations of these 
variables produce results that differ from the control condition. 
As in the efficiency-based transition, a set of analyses was conducted on the 
difference scores from phase to phase. Three difference scores were examined: 
the difference between Phase 2 and Phase 1 (D21), the difference between Phase 
3 and Phase 2 (D32), and the difference between Phase 3 and Phase 1 (D31). 
A one-way (group) ANOVA was computed with D21 as the dependent 
variable (see Table 18). A significant difference was found between the six 
groups (F(5,54) = 2.35, g < 0.05). A Tukey test was computed to further 
58 
determine significant differences between the pairs of individual groups. The 
Minimal Rule Group (170.8) was not significantly different from the Rule-
Following Nondependent Group, (162.2) the Rule Alone Group (153.8), the Rule-
Following Point Nondependent (137.2) or the Rule-Following Dependent Group 
(123.1). The Rule-Following Point Dependent Group (70.41) was not significantly 
different from the Rule-following Nondependent Group, the Rule Alone Group, 
the Rule-Following Point Nondependent Group and the Rule-Following 
Dependent Group. The Rule-Following Point Dependent Group was the only 
group to be significantly different from the Minimal Rule Group. The Rule-
Following Point Dependent Group had a the lowest D21 score. The Rule-
Following Point Dependent manipulation seems to induce higher degrees of 
insensitivity to the effectiveness based transition as measured by difference scores. 
A one-way (group) ANOVA was computed with D32 as the dependent 
variable (see Table 18). No significant differences were found between the six 
groups (F(5,54) = 0.36, p = ns). This suggests little appreciable effect of 
withdrawing the rule message. 
A one-way (group) ANOVA was computed with D31 as the dependent 
variable (see Table 18). A significant difference was found between the six 
groups (E(5,54) = 2.96, g < .05). A Tukey test was computed to further 
determine significant differences between the pairs of individual groups. The 
Minimal Rule Group (221.8) was not significantly different from the Rule Alone 
Group (195.6), Rule-Following Nondependent Group (194.2), the Rule-Following 
Point Nondependent Group (194.1) or the Rule-Following Dependent Group 
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(179.3). The Rule-Following Point Dependent Group (106.40) was not 
significantly different from the Rule-following Dependent Group, the Rule-
Following Point Nondependent Group, the Rule-Following Dependent Group, 
and the Rule Alone Group. The Rule-Following Point Dependent Group was the 
only group to be significantly different from the Minimal Rule Group. The Rule-
Following Point Dependent Group had a the lowest D31 score. These results 
indicate that the Rule-Following Point Dependent manipulation induced higher 
degrees of insensitivity to the change from the DRL 6 to the FR 1 schedule of 
reinforcement as measured by difference scores. 
A separate two-way (rule message x dependence) ANOVA was computed 
for the difference score data to assess differential influence of the type of rule 
message and rule message dependency on the three difference scores (see Table 
19). In the analysis for the D21 scores the results for dependence were significant 
(F(l,36) = 4.85, p < .0.05). The mean difference score for the subjects in groups 
that were given dependent messages (96.7) was found to be significantly different 
from the mean difference score for the subjects in the groups that received 
messages that were not dependent (149.7) based on a Tukey test. There was no 
significant effect for the rule message factor or the rule message x dependence 
interaction. 
There were no significant findings for the D32 and the D31 scores. Overall 
these results suggest that rule message type and dependence do not have 
differential effects on the subjects' adaptation (as measured by difference score) 
to the effectiveness-based transition or response to rule message withdrawal, but 
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certain combinations (namely the Rule-Following Point Dependent Group) of 
these variables produce results that differ from the control condition. There also 
may be some slight effect of dependence, suggesting that messages that are 
dependent may be more effective at inducing rule control than messages that are 
not dependent. However, this effect is weak at best. 
Non Parametric Analysis of Response Rate Data 
The data were also analyzed in a nonparametric fashion. Pilot work 
suggested that two specific patterns could indicate insensitivity to change from the 
DRL 6 to the FR 1 schedule of reinforcement. One pattern can be typified as a 
steady continuation of the previous pattern or a failure to show dramatic change. 
Operationally this was defined as a failure to show more than 30 responses in any 
of the 8 components in Phase 2. A second pattern is typified as a major change 
in response rate followed by a return to the original response rate shown prior to 
the transition. Operationally this was defined as a increase above 30 responses 
and a return to below 30 responses in any of the 8 components in Phase 2. Thirty 
responses was chosen because it was also the cutoff for receiving a positive versus 
a negative rule-following message in the dependent groups. In the Rule-Following 
Point Dependent group, 7 of 10 subjects were identified as being insensitive to the 
change. The next highest number of insensitive subjects per group is the Rule-
Following Dependent Group with two of ten subjects identified as showing 
insensitivity. Differences between the number of subjects in each of the six 
groups showing insensitivity versus sensitivity was examined via a Chi-square test 
(see Table 20). A significant difference was found (Chi-Square = 23.30, g < 
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.001). In order to guard against the possibility of error due to a high number of 
the expected values below 5, the data were collapsed to compare the number of 
sensitive versus insensitive subject in the rule-following point dependent group to 
the combined figures for all of the remaining groups (see Table 20). This test 
also revealed a significant difference (Chi-Square = 17.45, g < .001). 
The subjects who never show an increase above thirty do not contact the 
negative rule message. This insensitivity may have a different quality from the 
insensitivity that results from exposure to the negative rule message. When only 
those subjects who showed an increase above 30 with a subsequent return to 
below 30 are defined as insensitive (as opposed to those who never increased 
responding and thus may not have contacted the new point contingency), the 
resulting Chi-Square test (see Table 20) is significant as well (Chi-Square = 17.51, 
£ < .01). When the rule-following point dependent subjects who were exposed to 
negative rule-message are compared to the remaining subjects (see Table 20), 
significance is also obtained (Chi-Square = 10.41, g < .01). 
The same criteria for defining insensitivity were used to characterize the 
subjects' behavior in Phase 3. A Chi-Square table was constructed for the number 
of subjects showing the defined insensitivity patterns and subjects showing the 
defined sensitivity pattern in Phase 3 (See Table 20). No significant difference was 
found (Chi-Square = 7.451 p > 0.20). The nonparametric analyses provide 
additional evidence that the rule-following point dependent feedback leads to 
more insensitivity to the programmed contingencies than the other types of 
feedback. 
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Parametric Analysis of Point Data 
In addition to the response rate data, the mean number of points earned 
per two-minute component was calculated for each phase. The identical analyses 
were computed for the point data as with the mean number of responses per 
component. A one-way (group) ANOVA was computed to compare mean 
number of points earned per component across the six groups in Phase 1 (see 
Table 21). No significant differences (F(5,54) = 0.43, j) = ns) were found 
between the six groups in Phase 1. Uniform point earnings were observed in 
response to the DRL 6 schedule of reinforcement in effect during the last three 
components of Phase 1. The point earnings were uniform in spite of the 
differences in actual response rate among the six groups. 
The second phase marked the introduction of the FR 1 schedule of 
reinforcement. A one-way (group) ANOVA was computed to compare mean 
number of points earned per component across the six groups in Phase 2 (see 
Table 21). A significant difference (F(5,54) = 2.54, g = 0.05) was found between 
the six groups in Phase 2. A Tukey test was computed to determine significant 
differences between the pairs of individual groups. The Minimal Rule Group 
(23.1) was not significantly different from the Rule-Following Nondependent 
Group (20.9), the Rule Alone Group (19.7), the Rule-Following Dependent (18.4) 
or the Rule-Following Point Nondependent Group (18.0). The Rule-Following 
Point Dependent Group (10.1) was not significantly different from the Rule-
Following Nondependent Group, the Rule Alone Group, the Rule-Following 
Point Nondependent Group or the Rule-Following Dependent Group. The Rule-
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Following Point Dependent Group was the only group to be significantly different 
from the Minimal Rule Group. The Rule-Following Point Dependent Group had 
the lowest mean number of points earned per component than the other five 
groups. These results support the view that the lower response rates seen by the 
Rule-Following Point Dependent group affected the effectiveness of responding as 
defined by the number of points earned. 
Phase 3 marked the withdrawal of the rule messages. A one-way (group) 
ANOVA was computed to compare mean number of points earned per 
component across the six groups in Phase 3 (see Table 21). A significant 
difference (F(5,54) = 3.87, j> < 0.01) was found between the six groups in Phase 
3. A Tukey test was computed to determine significant differences between the 
pairs of individual groups. The Minimal Rule Group (29.2) was not significantly 
different from the Rule-Following Dependent Group (26.5), the Rule Alone 
Group (25.8), the Rule-Following Point Nondependent Group (25.4), or the Rule-
Following Nondependent Group (24.9). The Rule-Following Nondependent 
Group was not significantly differently from the Rule-Following Point Dependent 
Group (14.3). However, the Rule-Following Point Dependent Group earned 
significantly less points than the Rule-Following Point Nondependent Group, the 
Rule Alone Group, the Rule-Following Dependent Group or the Minimal Rule 
Group. Thus, the Rule-Following Point Dependent Group persisted in ineffective 
responding even when the rule-messages were withdrawn. 
A separate two-way (rule message x dependence) ANOVA was computed 
on the point data from each phase to assess differential influence of the type of 
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rule message and rule message dependency. There were no significant differences 
in the analyses for Phases 1 and 2 (see Tables 22). The results for Phase 3 (see 
Table 22) indicate that the effects for rule-messages and dependence were not 
significant. The interaction between rule-messages and dependence was 
significant (F(l,36) = 4.58, g < 0.05). This significant interaction is consistent 
with the finding that the Rule-Following Point Dependent Group seems to 
enhance rule-following as measured by point earnings. Taken together these 
results suggest that rule message type and dependence do not have differential 
effects on the subjects' adaptation to the effectiveness-based transition or response 
to rule message withdrawal when compared to each other, but certain 
combinations of these variables produce results that differ from the control 
condition. 
As with the response rate data, a set of analyses were conducted on the 
difference scores for points from phase to phase. Three differences scores were 
examined: the difference between Phase 2 and Phase 1 (D21), the difference 
between Phase 3 and Phase 2 (D32), and the difference between Phase 3 and 
Phase 1 (D31). 
A one-way (group) ANOVA was computed with D21 as the dependent 
variable (see Table 23). A significant difference was found between the six 
groups (E(5,54) = 2.54, p < 0.05). A Tukey test was computed to determine 
significant differences between the pairs of individual groups. The Minimal Rule 
Group (21.9) was not significantly different from the Rule-Following 
Nondependent Group (20), the Rule Alone Group (18.6), Rule-Following 
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Dependent Group (17.3), or the Rule-Following Point Nondependent Group 
(17.0). The Rule-Following Point Dependent Group (9.0) was not significantly 
different from the Rule-following Nondependent Group, the Rule Alone Group, 
the Rule-Following Dependent Group, or the Rule-Following Point 
Nondependent Group. The Rule-Following Point Dependent Group was the only 
group to be significantly different from the Minimal Rule Group. The Rule-
Following Point Dependent Group had a the lowest D21 score. The Rule-
Following Point Dependent manipulation seems to induce higher degrees of 
insensitivity to the effectiveness- based transition. 
A one-way (group) ANOVA was computed with D32 as the dependent 
variable (see Table 23). No significant differences were found between the six 
groups (F(5,54) = 0.67, j> = ns). 
A one-way (group) ANOVA was computed with D31 as the dependent 
variable (See Table 23). A significant difference was found between the six 
groups (F(5,54) = 3.89, c < 0.05). A Tukey test was computed to determine 
significant differences between the pairs of individual groups. The Minimal Rule 
Group (28.1) was not significantly different from the Rule-Following Dependent 
Group (25.4), the Rule Alone Group (24.7), the Rule-Following Point 
Nondependent Group (24.4), or the Rule-Following Nondependent Group (23.9). 
The Rule-Following Point Dependent Group (13.2) was not significantly different 
from the Rule-following Dependent Group yet was significantly different from the 
Rule-Following Dependent Group, the Rule Alone Group, and the Rule-
Following Point Nondependent Group. The Rule-Following Point Dependent 
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Group was the only group to be significantly different from the Minimal Rule 
Group. The Rule-Following Point Dependent Group had the lowest D31 score. 
These results indicate that the Rule-Following Point Dependent manipulation 
induced higher degrees of insensitivity to the change from the DRL 6 to the FR 1 
schedule of reinforcement. 
A separate two-way (rule message x dependence) analysis of variance was 
computed for the difference score data to assess differential influence of the type . 
of rule message and dependency. There were no statistically significant 
differences in these analyses for D21 and D32 (See Table 24). The two-way 
analysis for D31 (see Table 24) revealed no significant effects for the rule 
message factor or the dependence factor. However, the results for the rule 
message x dependence interaction was significant (F(l,36) = 4.57, £ < .05). This 
significant interaction is consistent with the differences between groups detected 
in the one-way analyses. These two analyses taken together suggest that the Rule-
Following Point Dependent Group may have been the only group to enhance 
rule-following. 
Overall these results suggest that rule message type and dependence did 
not have differential effects on the subjects' adaptation (as measured by difference 
score) to the effectiveness-based transition. In addition, these factors do not 
appear to impact subjects' response to rule message withdrawal in terms of 
calculated difference scores. However, certain combinations of these variables 
produced results that differ from the control condition. 
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Point Qf Contact With jh<? Schedule Change 
As with the efficiency-based transition, interresponse times were used to 
indicate the component in which a rather precise contact was made with the 
schedule transition. For example, a subject exposed to the shift from the DRL 6 
to the FR 1 may show the same low number of responses per component leading 
to the conclusion that responding is still occurring once every sue seconds. In 
reality such a subject could have responded rapidly for short periods within the 
component, made contact with the changed contingency, and then slowed down 
again. 
The computer recorded each time a interresponse time was less than two 
seconds. The two-second value was chosen because a two-second IRT would 
represent a rapid series of responding. There were 24 components during the 
DRL 6/FR 1 schedules. After the eighth component, the schedule was changed. 
Of interest were interresponse times less than two seconds during the two-minute 
components after the schedule was changed. The first component during which 
the subject accumulated one, four, and eight IRTs of less than two seconds were 
recorded for each subject. The point-of-contact data are precise indicators of 
when subjects showed very strong evidence of schedule control. 
A one-way (group) ANOVA was computed to analyze for between group 
differences in the mean component during which one, four, or eight IRTs of less 
than two seconds were shown (see Table 25). There were no significant 
differences between groups in terms of these dependent measures. On average, 
the subjects showed one IRT of less than two seconds during the 10th component 
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(9.7), four IRTs during the 10th component (10.5), and eight IRTs during the 
10th component (10.7). This indicates that subjects showed the first evidence as 
well as relatively strong evidence of contact approximately two components after 
the schedule change. 
As with the efficiency-based transition, correlations were computed to 
further assess the relationship between point of contact and response rate. With 
data on the effectiveness-based transition, there was a consistent significant 
negative correlation between the subjects' mean number of responses in Phase 2 
and the component number (in Phase 2 or 3, at which the subject accumulated 
one (r = -0.45366, = 0.0003), four (r = -0.58294, j> = 0.0001), and eight (r = -
0.59619, £ = 0.0001) interresponse times of less that two seconds. This suggests 
that the higher the observed response rate in Phase 2, the earlier the point of 
contact with the changed contingency. 
As with the efficiency-based transition, the response rate analyses were also 
conducted with point of contact as a covariate. These analyses examined the 
effects of verbal feedback on the maintenance of rule-following after the changed 
contingency had been contacted. The first component in which the subject 
showed eight IRTs of less than two seconds was used for the covariate. The 
analyses were only conducted for the mean number of responses in Phases 2 and 
3, as these were the two phases after the schedule change. 
A one-way (group) ANACOVAR was computed to compare mean number 
of responses per component across the six groups in Phase 2 (see Table 26). The 
first component in which the subject showed eight IRTs of less than two seconds 
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was used for the covariate. A significant difference (E(5,53) = 2.59, g < 0.05) 
was found between the six groups in Phase 2. Post hoc analyses were computed 
to determine if there were significant differences between the pairs of individual 
groups. The Rule-Following Point Dependent Group (101.8) had a significantly 
lower mean number of responses per component than each of the other five 
groups with the exception of the Rule-Following Point Nondependent Group 
(149.0). There were no additional significant differences between the remaining 
groups. This effect is represented graphically in Figure 1 (Figure 1 and all 
subsequent figures are located in Appendix D). 
The Rule-Following Point Dependent manipulation seemed to induce 
somewhat higher degrees of insensitivity in Phase 2 of the effectiveness-based 
transition, than four of the remaining five groups when point of contact was used 
as a covariate. 
Phase 3 begins with the withdrawal of the rule messages with a continued 
FR 1 schedule of reinforcement. A one-way (group) ANACOVAR was computed 
to compare mean number of responses per component across the six groups in 
Phase 3 (see Table 26). The first component in which the subject showed eight 
IRTs of less than two seconds was used for the covariate. A significant difference 
(F(5,53) = 3.15, £ = < .05) was found between the six groups in Phase 3. Post 
hoc analyses were computed to determine if there were significant differences 
between the individual groups. The Rule-Following Point Dependent Group (x = 
131.8) showed a significantly lower mean number of responses than the other five 
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groups. There were no other significant differences between the remaining five 
groups. This effect is represented graphically in Figure 1. 
The Rule-Following Point Dependent manipulation seemed to induce 
somewhat higher degrees of insensitivity to the FR1 schedule of reinforcement 
even after the rule messages had been withdrawn when point of contact was taken 
into account. 
A separate two-way (rule message x dependence) ANACOVAR was 
computed on data from each phase to assess differential influence of the type of 
rule message and dependence. The first component in which the subject showed 
eight IRTs of less than two seconds was used for the covariate. The analyses for 
Phase 2 (see Table 27) indicate significant effects for rule message type (F(l,35) 
= 3.94, g = .055). Post hoc analyses indicated that rule-following point feedback 
(121.6) produced lower mean number of responses than rule-following feedback 
(162.5). The interaction between rule-message type and dependence was not 
significant. The same test conducted with data from Phase 3 revealed no 
significant results (see Table 27). 
A set of ANACOVARs were also conducted on the difference scores from 
phase to phase. Three differences scores were examined: the difference between 
Phase 2 and Phase 1 (D21), the difference between Phase 3 and Phase 2 (D32), 
and the difference between Phase 3 and Phase 1 (D31). 
A one-way (group) ANACOVAR was computed with D21 as the 
dependent variable (see Table 28). A marginally significant difference was found 
between the six groups (F(5,53) = 2.14, g = 0.075). Post hoc analyses were 
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computed to determine significant differences between the individual groups. The 
Rule-Following Point Dependent Group (x = 84.2) had a significantly lower mean 
difference score than four of the other five groups. There were no additional 
significant differences between the remaining groups. These results are 
represented graphically in Figure 2. 
The Rule-Following Point Dependent manipulation seemed to induce 
somewhat higher degrees of insensitivity in Phase 2 of the effectiveness-based 
transition, than four of the other five groups when point of contact was used as a 
covariate. 
A one-way (group) ANACOVAR was computed with D32 as the 
dependent variable (see Table 28). No significant differences were found between 
the six groups (F(5,53) = 0.40, £ = ns). 
A one-way (group) ANACOVAR was computed with D31 as the 
dependent variable (see Table 28). A significant difference was found between 
the six groups (E(5,53) = 2.65, j2 < 0.05). Post hoc analyses were computed to 
determine significant differences between the pairs of individual groups. The 
Rule-Following Point Dependent Group (114.1) had a significantly lower mean 
difference score than each of the other five groups. There were no additional 
significant differences between the remaining groups. These results are 
represented graphically in Figure 2. 
The Rule-Following Point Dependent manipulation seemed to induce 
somewhat higher degrees of insensitivity in Phase 3 of the effectiveness-based 
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transition than the other five groups when point of contact was used as a 
covariate. 
A series of two-way (rule message x dependence) ANACOVARs was 
computed for the difference score data to assess differential influence of the type 
of rule message and rule message dependence on the three difference scores. 
The analysis for D21 (see Table 29) indicate no significant effects for the type of 
rule-message, dependence or their interaction. 
The two-way (rule message x dependence) ANACOVAR for D32 (see 
Table 29) indicated no significant effects for rule message type, dependence, and 
the interaction. 
The analyses for D31 (see Table 29) indicated significant effects for 
dependence (F(l,35) = , p < .06). Post hoc analyses indicated that dependent 
feedback produced lower mean number of responses (146.6) than nondependent 
feedback (190.4). The interaction between these two factors was not significant. 
The dependence of the rule messages appears to be an influential variable for this 
individual test and dependent variable. The fact that it has not been a 
consistently significant factor in other test does indicate that any effect is probably 
weak at best. 
Taken together, a general conclusion is that these results provided strong 
support for the conclusion that rule-following feedback plus task-performance 
feedback produced considerably more insensitivity to programmed contingencies 
than the other types of feedback. These effects are over and above individual 
differences in when the subjects come into contact with the contingencies. In fact, 
if point of contact is examined as a covariate the effects of rule-following 




The purpose of the present study was to explore empirically how verbal 
consequences related to rule-following affect control by rules. Rule-following 
feedback alone and rule-following feedback plus task performance feedback were 
the specific types of verbal consequences studied. The former involved feedback 
on the correspondence between the subject's behavior and a rule given at the 
beginning of the session. The latter involved this same feedback plus feedback on 
task performance or points earned. In other words, this second type of feedback 
was based on the rule-behavior correspondence as well as other programmed 
consequences affiliated with this correspondence. 
The dependence of rule-following feedback on the subject's behavior was 
also manipulated as a means of discerning if the effects of verbal stimuli as 
consequences were due to form alone or the form in a contingent relationship 
with behavior. 
Because rules and feedback could interact differently with different types 
of programmed schedules of reinforcement, two specific types of schedule 
transitions were employed. One transition enabled a possible increase in the 
efficiency of responding while a second involved a possible increase in the 
effectiveness of responding. 
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In the introduction, three issues were abstracted from the review of 
empirical and conceptual issues related to control by verbal stimuli: The degree to 
which verbal stimuli override control by programmed contingencies, possible 
contingency analyses of observed effects, and the utility of function-altering in 
describing the effects of verbal stimuli. Each may be reexamined now in light of 
the findings of the present study. 
Do Verbal Consequences Override Control bv Other Types of 
Consequences? 
The preceding review of the literature on verbal antecedents indicate that 
they often override control by programmed contingencies. In the present study, 
rule-following feedback alone, either dependent or not dependent on rule-
compliance, did not appreciably affect the subjects' response to the efficiency or 
effectiveness-based transitions. Rule-following feedback plus task performance 
feedback, however, significantly overrode control by the programmed 
contingencies provided a) the schedule transition involved a possible increase in 
effectiveness and b) the rule-following messages were dependent on the subjects' 
behavior. 
These conclusions are based on three types of data: (a). Parametric 
analysis of mean number of responses and points earned per component in Phases 
2 and 3 (and difference scores for these values); (b). Similar analyses on the 
mean number of responses per component using point of contact with the 
changed contingency as a covariate, and (c). Non-parametric analyses of the 
number of subjects in each group showing insensitivity to programmed 
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contingencies. In the first set of analyses, the Rule-Following Point Dependent 
Group was the only group to show lower mean number of responses, point 
earnings, and corresponding difference scores than the Minimal Rule Group in 
both Phases 2 and 3. The Rule-Following Point Dependent Group was not 
significantly different from the other groups when examined without point of 
contact as a covariate, though the trends were consistent across both Phases 2 and 
3 and across several dependent measures. When point of contact with the 
schedule was used as a covariate, the rule-following point dependent group 
showed strong differences from the other five groups on the number of responses 
in Phase 2 and 3, and the associated difference scores. This increased effect seen 
in the analysis of covariance indicates that the insensitivity shown by the Rule-
Following Point Dependent Group was primarily an issue of the differential 
maintenance of rule-following in the face of contingency contact. In the non-
parametric analyses, more subjects in the Rule-Following Point Dependent Group 
were operationally defined as showing insensitivity in Phase 2 than in any other 
group. Taken together, these analyses indicate that rule-following feedback plus 
task performance feedback was the only type of feedback to override control by 
the programmed contingencies and produce significant evidence of rule-following. 
The fact that the addition of concurrent feedback on task performance only 
overrode control by programmed contingencies when rule-following feedback was 
dependent on the subject's actual compliance with the rule suggests that the 
contingent relationship between feedback and behavior rather than the form of 
the feedback alone was important. If both the dependent and nondependent 
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groups had shown equal effects and more insensitivity than the Rule Alone 
Group, the antecedent functions of the verbal feedback would have been 
implicated. However, since the Rule-Following Point Dependent Group produced 
a greater degree of insensitivity than the Rule-Following Point Nondependent 
Group, the consequential nature of the message is suggested. 
Differences in the Efficiency Versus Effectiveness-Based Transitions 
The data were analyzed separately for the efficiency-based and the 
effectiveness-based transition. The utility of analyzing the data from these 
transitions separately appeared to be validated by different results for the two 
types of schedule transitions. The differential effect of feedback form and 
dependency on response to the effectiveness-based transition were discussed 
above. 
In the efficiency-based transition, the six experimental groups did not 
produce differential effects. The type of feedback as well as the dependence of 
the feedback did not account for a significant amount of the variance for any of 
the dependent measures: the mean number of responses per phase, mean 
number of points per phase, the mean difference between phases in mean number 
of responses and points, and the number of subjects showing response patterns 
operationally defined as sensitive or insensitive. This basic effect also held true 
when point of contact with the schedule was used as a covariate. 
In the efficiency-based transition, the "cost" of insensitivity is expending 
higher amount of effort without a change in the delivery of reinforcement. High 
amounts of effort may not necessarily be aversive in a relatively nonengaging task. 
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In other words it is better to do something than to do nothing. Given this 
analysis, it is conceivable that subjects who contact the efficiency-based transition 
may continue to show high rates of responding. This appears to actually be the 
case. Subjects on average showed contact with the schedule change within 32 
minutes of the transition yet on average did not fall much below a 50% decrease 
in responding from baseline or 250 responses per two minutes. 
Summary 
In summary, rule-following feedback plus task performance feedback was 
the only type of feedback in the context of the current study that appreciably led 
to correspondence between the subject's behavior and the rule. An increased 
correspondence between rule and behavior was observed in this feedback 
condition only with the effectiveness-based transition and when the feedback was 
dependent on the subject's actual rate of responding. The question remains as to 
why this particular feedback showed such an effect. Subsequent discussion will 
analyze this effect in terms of the theoretical points as described in Chapter I. 
Accounts of the Observed 
Effects of Verbal Consequences 
The present experiment proved to be a difficult context in which to 
examine differences between various types of verbal feedback. The Rule Alone 
Group did not show appreciable insensitivity to the effectiveness or efficiency-
based transition. With other types of schedule transitions, these same rules have 
been shown to produce insensitivity in and of themselves (Hayes et al., 1986 a,b). 
Rule-following feedback alone did not have an appreciable effect on subsequent 
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adherence to the rules. This was true in both the effectiveness and efficiency-
based transitions. Thus, the current experiment looked at differences between 
types of verbal consequences in the context of both an impotent rule and 
generally ineffective rule-following feedback. Simple additive effects of different 
variables would be difficult to detect in such a context. 
Against that background, the clear insensitivity produced by the Rule-
Following Point Dependent condition deserves special attention. What might 
account for it? We will consider several alternatives. 
Specificity 
Specific rules have been shown to produce more control than general rules 
(Olson & Hayes, 1984). Specificity refers to the degree to which environmental 
or behavioral aspects of contingencies are described with precision. For example, 
the statement "Go Slow" specifies that the speed of response is at issue, but is 
imprecise beyond that. Individual members of the verbal community may have 
widely different histories with regard to the word "slow." Does the word have to 
do with the rate of response repetition, or the speed of each response considered 
individually? If it has to do with the rate of response repetition, how slow is 
"slow?" A more specific rule such as "press 30 times in two minutes" would evoke 
more consistent behavior by the verbal community. Similarly, more specific 
feedback messages may exert stronger control over behavior. When the verbal 
community responds consistently to behavior or verbal specifications, it can in 
turn consistently reinforce rule-following or punish rule-breaking with a greater 
degree of precision. 
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In the current study, the presentation of positive versus negative feedback 
was based on a set response criterion. When the subjects pressed 30 times or less 
during the two-minute component, they were told that they were following the 
rule and when they pressed more than 30 times they were told that they were not 
following the rule. However, these criteria were not specifically made available to 
the subject in verbal form. 
In addition to reliance on qualitative or quantitative aspects of response 
topography, the verbal community can also make use of response products, 
incorporating them into instructions or feedback involving the behavior. For 
example, the feedback "You smoke too much" may be based not on actual 
observation of smoking but on the number of cigarette butts observed in an 
ashtray. Verbal feedback can explicitly refer to these products: "You smoke too 
much! I found ten cigarette butts in your room!" The addition of task 
performance feedback to rule-following feedback in the current study can be 
thought of this way. Points are response products. Incorporating these response 
products into feedback may increase the specificity of the feedback. Points could 
be taken to be a verifiable metric by which the verbal community metes out 
reinforcement or punishment for rule-following or rule-breaking. 
In the current study, positive feedback was provided for rule-following 
when subjects responded fewer than 30 times and earned approximately two 
points per two minutes and negative feedback was provided when subjects 
responded more than 30 times and earned more than two points per two minutes. 
This may have had the effect of establishing the sum total of points earned per 
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two minutes as a response product that was the basis for reinforcement or 
punishment meted out by the verbal community. The increase in specificity may 
directly effect the strength and consistency of rule-following feedback as a 
consequence that reinforces and punishes rule-following. 
However, there may be additional effects of incorporating response 
products in the form of points into feedback on rule-following. At the onset of 
the experiment, the subjects were told: Try and earn as many points as you can." 
This statement along with the mention of points being exchangeable for chances 
at a prize presumably established points as a reinforcer. The specificity analysis 
describes how combining feedback on point earning with feedback on rule-
following can establish point earnings as a criteria for punishment meted out by 
the verbal community. Such an operation may act directly on the reinforcing 
value of points. In addition to enhancing the consistency of rule-following 
feedback, incorporating points as response products into feedback on rule-
following may change the function of points from reinforcing to punishing. 
Concepts derived from the theory and research on function-altering may point to 
additional contingencies which contribute to the observed effect and consequently 
improve the precision of the specificity account. 
Function-Altering as a Descriptive Account of the 
Effectiveness of Verbal Consequences 
The specificity analysis argued that incorporating response products into 
feedback on rule-following might allow the verbal community to reinforce rule-
following and punish rule-breaking more consistently. Note, however, that points 
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now serve a different function. In the absence of feedback, they are delivered as 
consequences for task-performance and appear to reinforce this behavior. With 
the addition of feedback, they may be specified as indicators of rule-breaking. 
They are given in the context of aversive feedback and may come to have 
punishing functions once more than two points are earned in a two-minute period. 
The data can be construed as supporting a change in the function of points. 
That points can function as reinforcers in this experimental situation is supported 
by several observations. Subjects given minimal rules and accurate rules worked 
readily to earn points, both pressing slow on the DRL 6 schedule and pressing 
many times per minute on the FR 18 schedule. There were no gross differences 
in response rate and especially points earned across all groups in the first phase of 
the experiment. Following the effectiveness-based transition, subjects in the 
Minimal Rule Group and the four other ruled groups showed marked increases in 
response rate soon after making contact with the transition. These observations 
indicate that points exerted strong control over behavior except when dependent 
rule-following feedback plus task performance feedback was given. Perhaps this 
effect was not solely due to some other contingency overriding the reinforcing 
function of points, but to a change in that function directly. 
The effects of rule-following feedback plus task performance feedback 
lasted into the third phase, well after the feedback messages were withdrawn. 
When antecedent rules are presented and subsequently withdrawn, compliance 
with the rule rapidly desists if non-compliance is known to be more effective in 
terms of point earnings (Hayes et al., 1986b). The removal of the rule-following 
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plus task performance feedback did not result in such a return to effective 
responding, even though the changed contingency had been contacted. The 
feedback was withdrawn but the delivery of points continued but did not seem to 
reinforce behavior in the same way as before. If feedback established points as 
aversive, their continuance would continue to punish rule-breaking, possibly for 
some time after the feedback was removed. Thus it may be that presenting task 
performance feedback in the context of rule-following feedback altered the 
reinforcing function of points. 
The previous discussion of function-altering could shed light on the 
behavioral processes possibly involved in this change in function. At the onset of 
the experiment, the subject was given a verbal rule. The actual rule in this case 
instructed the subject to "Press slowly with several seconds between each push." 
The elements of this verbal rule could be seen as participating in equivalence 
classes with the actual behavior of pressing, and the behavioral quality of slowness 
defined in terms of temporal delay. The form of the verbal feedback was this: 
"You are (not) following the rule given at the beginning of the session. You 
earned x points in the last two minutes." The words "You are not following the 
rule" may participate in an equivalence class with the actual event of the subject 
pressing the button at a certain rate with respect to a rule. Presumably these 
words may also have some aversive qualities. This statement is generally paired 
with the statement "You earned x points," provided the value of x is above 2 (that 
is, provided the response rate is in violation of the rule). The pairing may 
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establish "x points" as aversive, where x > 2. The aversive function of the words 
"x points" may transfer to the actual points via equivalence. 
There is one difficulty with these analyses. Rule-following feedback is not 
effective in punishing behavior in and of itself. How then does it acquire this 
function when paired with task performance feedback? There are two ready 
possibilities. First, rule-following feedback may be aversive but ineffective as a 
punisher because it is too long delayed. Since the pairing of rule-following 
feedback and the points is immediate and the points themselves are much less 
delayed throughout the task, the function-altering effect might enable a mildly 
aversive but consequentially ineffective stimulus to establish another stimulus as 
consequentially effective. Second, task performance and rule-following feedback 
may together cue possible social consequences in a fashion unlike either alone. 
As described earlier, points as response products are readily identifiable and 
quantifiable. In the past, the verbal community may have been more likely to 
administer aversive consequences for breaking a rule when the behavior of 
interest or its products are readily identifiable. Thus, the presence of verifiable 
task performance feedback may alter the effects of rule-following feedback. 
The differential results with the efficiency versus effectiveness-based 
transitions further supports a function-altering interpretation. Rule-following 
feedback plus task-performance feedback increased rule-following only in the 
effectiveness-based transition. These results are expected given a function-altering 
account. In the effectiveness-based transition, positive feedback was paired with 
the delivery of < 2 points and negative feedback was paired with the delivery of 
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> 2 points. It was argued that this pairing changed the function of points. This 
pairing did not occur in the efficiency-based transition. Because this transition did 
not lead to a possible increase in point delivery, the point delivery remained the 
same regardless if the rule was being followed or not. The subjects could earn 
the same amount of points by pressing more than 100 times or by pressing once 
following the given interval. Therefore the amount of points earned was not 
associated with positive or negative feedback. Given the account presented 
above, a change in function would not be expected to occur. Rule-following 
feedback plus task performance feedback could therefore be functionally 
equivalent to rule-following feedback alone in the efficiency-based transition. 
Summary 
The preceding discussion merges elements of the specificity and function-
altering account. The specificity account deals more with the contingency 
arrangements that enhance rule-following. The function-altering account 
describes how a rather complex message that incorporates feedback on response 
products with rule-following feedback may alter the function of the response 
products and augment control by contingencies for rule-following. These two 
interpretations are quite compatible and together comprise a reasonable 
formulation. The formulation requires additional empirical support. The 
limitations of the current study suggest some additional experiments that would 
continue to explore the contingency and function-altering effects of rule-following 
feedback. 
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Limitations of the Present Study and Future Research 
The exploratory nature of this study is a strength as well as a weakness. Its 
strength is in bringing empirical methods to bear on a largely unstudied area. A 
natural implication of such exploratory research is that it often raises more 
empirical questions than it answers. Such is the case in this study. The strategy 
in this section is to explore some of the issues suggested by this study and to build 
a description of a future research program around them. 
The actual mechanism underlying the effectiveness of rule-following 
feedback plus task performance feedback requires empirical attention. I 
described a function-altering account which dealt with the combined effects of 
these two types of feedback and their impact on the reinforcing function of points. 
This feedback was given every two minutes and was in addition the ongoing 
feedback regarding total point earnings given at the actual time of point delivery. 
The function-altering account described how the verbal pairing of rule-following 
feedback (presumably an aversive verbal stimulus in the context of rule breakage) 
and task performance feedback (a reinforcing verbal stimulus) changes the 
function of task performance feedback. The change in function for the verbal 
stimuli transfers to its "referents", actual points. A way to model such a change 
would be to deliver rule-following feedback concurrently with the actual delivery 
of points. Each time a point was delivered, feedback on rule-following could be 
given as well. If the effect of this manipulation were similar to the effect seen in 
the present study, the function-altering account would be more credible. 
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Additional groups would help refine the analysis. Giving rule-following 
feedback along with point delivery also has the effect of giving rule-following 
feedback more frequently. Recall that rule-following feedback alone was not 
effective in inducing insensitivity in either schedule transition. If increasing the 
frequency of rule-following feedback makes it effective, whether or not it is paired 
with points, it would rule out the possibility that task performance and rule-
following feedback may together cue possible social consequences in a fashion 
unlike either alone. It would make more plausible the view that the linkage 
between points and rule-following overcame the problems with delayed rule-
following feedback. 
Other conditions might help examine the specificity interpretation of the 
effectiveness of verbal feedback. The argument was made that rule-following plus 
task performance feedback might enhance the specificity and thus the 
effectiveness of the feedback because it incorporates response products into the 
feedback. Perhaps the rule-following feedback itself could be made more 
"specific" by stating the specific criteria for the feedback. This might take the 
form of "You are following the rule you were given at the beginning of the 
session. You responded more than thirty times in the last two minutes." If this 
feedback was more effective at inducing rule-following, the importance of 
specificity in general would be highlighted. If such an effect deteriorated when 
rule-following feedback was withdrawn, the role of the points in maintaining rule-
following in Phase 3 would be implicated. If no deterioration occurred, specificity 
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per se, with no appeal to function-altering, would be strengthened as an 
explanation for the present results. 
The preceding research ideas empirically address some of the issues 
suggested by the theoretical analysis of the effects of the feedback studied here. 
Some general modifications might improve on the empirical soundness of the 
current methodology as well. 
The effects of rule-following feedback on efficiency-based transitions was 
not fully tested in this experiment. The results indicate that the efficiency-based 
transition was a difficult one for human subjects to detect. The mean number of 
responses across all subjects decreased by 50% between Phase 1 and 3. However, 
in Phase 3 the subjects were still responding an average of 250 times per 
component. This is a relatively high response rate in view of the fact that 40 
response per two minutes would satisfy an FT 4 (the average FT Yoked value) 
schedule of reinforcement. Even though subjects on average had one IRT of 
greater than four seconds, they did not show evidence of stronger contact until 
after 32 minutes of responding. In comparison, subjects showed strong contact as 
evidenced by IRTs on average after 22 minutes of responding in response to the 
effectiveness-based transition. 
The overall tendency for the subjects not to show a decrease beyond 50% 
has implications for the interpretations of the effects of rule-following feedback. 
Human behavior in response to programmed schedules of reinforcement is 
notoriously variable. If the average decrease is about 50%, then a group that 
varies from this mean must show either extremely consistent high or low response 
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rates for a statistically significant difference to be detected. A ceiling or floor 
effect may be occurring here. 
There are also some aspects of the efficiency-based transition that may 
have contributed to the ineffectiveness of rule-following feedback. In Phase 2, the 
average rate of 334 response per component on the FI Yoked schedule of 
reinforcement would result in very limited contact with the negative rule message 
which was given if subjects went below 100 response in a component. These 
effects of rule-following feedback may not have been adequately tested for the 
efficiency-based transition. Perhaps future research on this schedule might involve 
a more stringent criterion for negative feedback (e.g. 300 responses). 
The difficulty detecting the change might also be attributed to the specific 
multiple schedule used in this study. The effectiveness based transition might 
indirectly affect performance on the efficiency-based transition. The effectiveness-
based transition was contacted very early in the second phase and resulted in 
higher response rates and much higher point earnings. This might result in a 
contrast effect that indirectly influenced higher response rates on the FI yoked. 
Future study of the efficiency-based transition might be conducted with single-
subject design. 
A final issue involves the interaction of antecedent rules with the schedules 
discussed here. The effects of feedback on rule-produced insensitivity were given 
a strong test in this experiment. Rules were not shown to produce insensitivity to 
either schedule when compared to minimal rule situations. It would be of interest 
to examine the feedback studied here in situations where rules have proven to be 
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more effective. A transition to extinction has been used in previous experiments 
when accurate rules have been shown to induce insensitivity (Hayes et al., 1986). 
In addition, the rule used here might be modified to be more powerful. Perhaps 
eliminating phrases such as "try and earn as many points as you can" and "the best 
way to earn points" will put the emphasis more on compliance. In addition, 
response criteria could be made more specific: "Presses must be followed by a six 
second pause" and "Press at least 200 times." could be substituted for "Press slowly 
with several seconds between each push." and "Press rapidly." 
In summary, these limitations and suggestions for future research take two 
forms. One is to further explore the mechanism behind the qualitative effect of 
rule-following plus task performance feedback in light of the effect that both types 
of feedback alone are impotent. The second involves general changes that may 
enhance rule compliance and the effectiveness of rule-following feedback. 
Together, these ideas imbed the current study in a research program that will 
begin to address the issues raised by verbal feedback. The current study is 
exploratory in nature and its generalizability cannot be taken for granted, 
however. Future replication and study will allow for increased generalizability 
and external validity. 
Implications of the Present Study 
As an initial exploratory study of verbal consequences and their relation to 
rule-following, this study indicates that verbal consequences can enhance rule-
following in spite of a schedule transition that pits programmed contingencies 
against rules. Given that there has been little human operant research on the 
91 
effects of verbal consequences, this finding indicates the value of continued 
research on verbal consequences and their interaction with rules. An example of 
such a research program was described above. 
This study also has implications for the literature on rule-governed 
behavior in general. While there have been many studies demonstrating that 
rules often override control by programmed contingencies of reinforcement, there 
has been comparatively little research on the factors leading to this effect. 
Behavior-analytic theory has long held that rule-following can be a result of 
collateral contingencies specifically supporting rule-following and often times 
competing against the very contingencies specified in the rule (Catania et al., 
1989; Cerutti, 1989; Skinner, 1969; Zettle & Hayes, 1982). Theoretically, rule-
induced insensitivity to programmed contingencies under certain conditions is 
predicted. However, direct empirical study of this phenomena has been limited. 
The present study directly addresses this issue and in addition brings empirical 
methods to bear on the role that verbal consequences may play in establishing 
such contingencies. 
The results also suggest that a comprehensive analysis of the impact of the 
verbal consequence studied here requires the incorporation of function-altering in 
addition to consequential sources of control. This point is based on observations 
of how a relatively complex stimuli such as rule-following feedback plus task 
performance feedback appeared to impact the function of programmed 
consequences. An important implication of the current study is that it highlights 
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how observations in a more naturalistic yet controlled setting suggests further 
research at this level as well as at a more basic level. 
The present study suggests two levels of analysis for the study of function-
altering. One strategy would be to further study changes in stimulus functions 
resulting from verbal stimulation. Research to date has studied instructions in 
terms of their evocative effects on behavior. The function-altering effects have 
been neglected or obscured. This literature could be reevaluated in terms of how 
specific instructions might have also altered the function of the stimuli employed 
in specific experiments. In addition, there is a need for studies that specifically 
look at how rules impact the function of stimuli. An example of this, is the 
research on repeated acquisition that has begun to address how rules impact the 
formation of complex stimulus sequences via function-altering (e.g. Danforth, 
Chase, Dolan, & Joyce, 1990). 
A second focus would be to further study the relationship between the 
observed function-altering effects of verbal stimuli and the function-altering effect 
that has been observed in the equivalence preparation. Research on equivalence 
has the advantage of being more controlled. We know that equivalence as a 
phenomena has so far only been demonstrated in verbal humans (Devany, Hayes 
& Nelson, 1986). This implies a possible relationship between equivalence and 
the type of function-altering that results from verbal stimulation. If words acquire 
functions via an equivalence like phenomena, then understanding equivalence 
might lead to a better understanding of the effects of words when combined into a 
rule form. 
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The discussion of the relationship between function-altering and 
equivalence presented here, highlights how little is known about these two 
phenomena. They seem related but in a sense represent parallel types of. 
analyses. They both are descriptions of effects. What is missing is precise 
knowledge of how these effects are established in humans. Does equivalence 
underlie verbal function-altering or are the two processes essentially the same 
thing? Such analyses have been slow to develop even in the controlled study of 
matching to sample preparations. 
The current study points to the need for such an analysis. The apparent 
function-altering effects of the rule-following feedback plus task performance 
feedback highlights how little is really known about both function-altering as an 
effect and equivalence as a possible analytic preparation that might help 
understand this effect. Therefore an implication of the current study is the fact 
that it points to important basic research on verbal stimuli. This work would be 
crucial in developing more precise analytic concepts which appear necessary to 
help explain the effects of such complex verbal stimuli. 
The current study is both naturalistic and exploratory. The stimuli used 
here are complex and novel. It is naturalistic in the sense that there is much 
room for intrusion by the vast social verbal histories that subjects bring to the 
experimental situation. It is novel in the sense that verbal consequences for rule-
following have not been extensively studied in the human operant laboratory. 
The value of exploratory and naturalistic research on the effects of verbal 
stimuli is to be seen in the implications discussed above. The rather involved and 
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perhaps imprecise interpretations of what might be happening in the current 
setting point to difficult questions and reveal areas of imprecision in terms of the 
behavioral principles that have been brought to bear on rule-following. For 
example, accounts of rules as contingency-specifying discriminative stimuli have 
lead to interesting developments in theory (Skinner, 1969; Zettle & Hayes, 1982) 
and research (Baron & Galizio, 1983) that have helped predict and control this 
difficult phenomena as well as explain it in terms of observable and manipulatable 
events. However, the concept of a contingency-specifying stimulus and how it acts 
on behavior have not been precisely explained. The arguments for function-
altering point to the precision gap and suggest the beginnings of research that will 
bring a more precise understanding of rules and the exact ways that they impact 
behavior. 
The exploratory nature of this study has some additional values. This 
experiment started with the well-researched situation of the human operant 
laboratory and incorporated a variable that has applied relevance, has not before 
been studied in this context, and addresses an important issue with respect to 
collateral contingencies for rule-following. Due to the novelty of the variable and 
the imprecision of current theory on verbal stimuli, the study did not follow a 
strict hypothesis-testing model. However, the outcome did suggest some lines of 
research that could become progressively more precise in terms of the actual 
issues that are examined. 
The naturalistic quality of the current study was referred to abo\ * It is in 
fact on a continuum in terms of experimental control. The basic implications 
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discussed above are at one end, the applied arena at another, and human operant 
research and this study in the middle. The implication of this middle ground is 
that it provides a bridge between the precise experimentation of the basic lab and 
the rather vague yet socially important research in the clinical laboratory. Its 
further value is in providing an empirical preparation to foster the use of basic 
principles in predicting and controlling human behavior in the applied arena. 
Rules and feedback are important aspects of teaching in a verbal 
community. Laboratory research and resultant theoretical interpretation of rule-
governance have formed the basis for applied interventions and interpretations of 
existing clinical procedures. For example, the findings and theory of rule-
governance have been applied to the interpretation of the effectiveness of 
cognitive-behavioral therapies (Zettle & Hayes, 1982). Clinical research has 
demonstrated that the social contingencies engaged by instructions are a critical 
component of the effect of some verbal therapies (Hayes et al., 1985; Hayes & 
Wolf, 1984; Rosenfarb & Hayes, 1984; Zettle & Hayes, 1983). The prevailing 
theory behind these therapies posits that changing thoughts or self instructions is 
an integral aspect of their effectiveness. An account based on social contingencies 
leads to somewhat different interventions than one based on this assumption. In 
addition, factors resulting in social control can be more directly targeted. 
The current study suggests how rules and verbal consequences might be 
brought to bear on clinically significant behavior. Take for example the clinical 
lore surrounding effective parenting. Clinicians in applied settings often talk 
about the importance of highlighting the natural consequences for rule-following. 
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Such a rule might take the form of "Clean your room because it makes it easier to 
find your toys." The implication is that such a rule might bring the behavior of 
room cleaning under the control of the natural consequence of access to toys. 
This is presumed to be healthier than rules focusing solely on social control (e.g. 
Clean your room or you lose your TV). 
This analysis may be called into question if the role of feedback in such a 
setting is examined. Take for example the following feedback given when a child 
complains of not being able to find a toy. Successful feedback might take the 
form: "See! if you had done what I asked and cleaned your room you would have 
been able to find your toys." At first, such feedback would presumably help to 
bring room cleaning under the control of the natural consequence. An analysis 
based on the results presented here might draw a different conclusion. It is 
apparent that finding toys is not a strong enough reinforcer to override the 
contingencies leading to a dirty room. The feedback in fact might work because it 
ties feedback on task performance to feedback on rule adherence. The effect 
might be to change the relatively ineffectual reinforcing function of finding toys to 
more aversive functions established by the use of observed toy finding as a metric 
for rule-following. What was thought to be more naturalistic feedback may 
indeed be coercive social feedback. 
This analysis is an example of how the effects of the current study may be 
extended, in theory, to clinical phenomena. Actual practical extension should be 
done with caution and only after further replication. The example does serve to 
highlight implications for the understanding of clinical phenomena. 
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In conclusion, the present work suggests the efficacy of rule-following 
feedback in conjunction with task performance feedback in enhancing compliance 
with rules, even when the rules directly compete with a programmed contingency. 
This finding points to one type of collateral contingency (Cerutti, 1989) that may 
enhance compliance in and of itself. The effectiveness of this specific type of 
feedback suggests that in addition to providing competing collateral consequences 
for rule-following, the feedback may work to alter the function of consequences 
for task performance - thus leading to an even stronger effect than reinforcing 
rule-following or punishing rule breakage. These results and their interpretation 
have implications for the development of further basic research on function-
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I agree to participate in the present study being conducted under the 
supervision of Dr. Steven C. Hayes, a faculty member of the Psychology 
Department at the University of Nevada-Reno. I have been informed in writing 
and orally about the procedures to be followed and about any discomforts or risks 
which may be involved. The investigator has offered to answer further questions 
that I have regarding the procedures of this study. I understand that I am free to 
withdraw from the study at any time without penalty or prejudice. The 
information gained from this study will be presented in such a way that my 
identity will remain confidential. I also understand that when my participation is 
over I will be thoroughly debriefed about the study. 
If I have any concerns or questions, I understand that I can contact Dr. Steven 
C. Hayes, Department of Psychology (784-6668), or the UNR Biomedical/Social 







This experiment was conducted in a sub-field of psychology called operant 
psychology. In operant psychology, we find it useful to distinguish between two 
types of behavior: Contingency- shaped behavior and a subset of contingency-
shaped behavior called rule-governed behavior. Contingency-shaped behavior is 
controlled by its consequences while rule-governed behavior is under the control 
of a verbal antecedent or rule. An example of contingency-shaped behavior 
would be a child who carries her umbrella to school because she walked out the 
door that morning and was rained on. An example of rule- governed behavior 
would be a child who carried an umbrella because her mother told her to do so. 
The research in our lab is concerned with the interaction between control by 
rules and consequences. In previous experiments, we have examined how the 
presence of rules interact with actual consequences in the control of human 
behavior. We have found that when a person's behavior is controlled by rules, it 
is often insensitive to a change in consequences. For example, if a mother was 
overprotective, a child may carry an umbrella to school every day even if it rarely 
rained. 
It may be the case that rule-produced insensitivity is a result of the way that 
we are taught to follow rules. One method of teaching might stress that rules are 
always to be followed while another might teach that rule are only to be followed 
if they lead to effective actions or beneficial consequences. In this experiment, we 
examined two different strategies for establishing rule-governed behavior. One 
strategy involved giving feedback which encouraged rule following. Subjects 
exposed to this strategy might be expected to follow a rule about task 
performance even after the task changed. This would might be due to the 
emphasis on following rules for the sake of following rules. 
A second strategy might emphasize following rules because they lead to more 
effective behavior or to desirable consequences. We might expect subjects trained 
with this procedure to stop following rules if these rules were found to no longer 
be effective. This is because an emphasis is placed on the consequences of rule-
following as opposed to rule following in and of itself. 
All groups were exposed to approximately the same task, but were given 
different feedback messages. The feedback messages were intended to reflect the 
two strategies that were discussed above. One consisted of feedback on rule-
following alone and another consisted of feedback on rule-following and point 
earnings. Sometimes the feedback was accurate and sometimes the feedback was 
inaccurate in that the subjects were always told that they were following the rule, 
regardless of their performance. Some subjects did not receive feedback messages 
at all. The feedback messages were only presented in the middle of the 
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experiment so that we could examine differences in behavior when the messages 
were both present and absent. 
In both sessions, presses on the left button moved the circle down, and 
presses on the right button moved the circle to the right. For the first 32 minutes, 
the movement of the circle was programmed as follows. When the blue light was 
on, each press had to be followed by a six second pause in order to make the 
circle move. If a response occurred before the six seconds were over, the timer 
was reset and the circle would not move. When the red light was on, the circle 
moved after every 18th press on either button. 
After the first 32 minutes the way to move the circle was changed. This is the 
most critical phase of the experiment. In the first 32 minutes, we could not be 
sure if your button pressing was controlled by the instructions that we gave you or 
the points that you received. Therefore we changed the way to get points. When 
the blue light was on, every press resulted in the circle moving. When the red 
light was on, the first press after a certain time interval resulted in the circle 
moving. The interval was based on the number of times that you pressed the 
button in the last red phase before the change occurred. If subjects changed their 
responding when the task changed, then we could say that their behavior was 
controlled by the points (contingency-shaped). If subjects did not change their 
responding, their behavior was most likely rule-governed. In this way, we were 
able to determine how the different feedback strategies effect the control exerted 
by rules and consequences. 
This study has implications for learning how human behavior is controlled and 
how feedback interacts with rules. In addition, these types of studies have 
implications for clinical psychology. For instance, certain clinical problems may 
be marked by extremely rigid rule following regardless of the consequences of 
such behavior. For example, a depressed person may operate under the rule "No 
matter what I do nothing ever works." and be totally insensitive to actual successes 
in her life. This is an example of an extension of laboratory results to every day 
life and much more research is required before we can fully understand control 
by rules and the role of rules in clinical phenomena. 
Thank you very much for participating in the experiment today. We will give 
away the prize money at the end of the semester and will call you if you are a 
winner. The number of points that you earned will be adjusted to control for any 
advantages that may have resulted only from the task or instruction that you 
received. Please do not talk about the experiment to other students who might be 
participating in it in the future. In addition, please feel free to call Dr. Hayes if 





Mean Number of Responses Per Component in Phase 1 for the FR 18 Schedule 
of Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Group 5 5197.13 0.39 
Error 54 13399.37 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component in Phase 2 for the FI Yoked 
Schedule of Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Group 5 13873.17 0.47 
Error 54 29213.44 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component in Phase 3 for the FI Yoked 
Schedule of Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Group 5 9829.57 0.32 
Error 54 31153.19 
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Table 2 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component in Phase 1 for the FR18 Schedule of 
Reinforcement: Rule Message (2) x Dependence (2) Two-Way ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Rule Message 1 777.22 0.05 
Dependence 1 14965.30 1.04 
Rule Message x Dependene 1 686.08 0.05 
Error 36 14321.65 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component in Phase 2 for the FT Yoked 





Rule Message x Dependence 
Error 
df MS F 
1 43232.60 1.88 
1 65.72 0.00 
1 25150.73 1.09 
36 23050.46 
I l l  
Table 2 (continued) 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component in Phase 3 for the FI Yoked 
Schedule of Reinforcement: Rule Message (2) x Dependence (2) Two-Way 
ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Rule Message 1 229.73 0.01 
Dependence 1 9997.00 0.33 
Rule Message x Dependence 1 4892.06 0.16 
Error 36 30377.76 
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Table 3 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component Difference Scores Between Phase 2 
and 1 for the FR 18/FI Yoked Schedule of Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way 
ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Group 5 21165.01 0.89 
Error 54 23798.71 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component Difference Scores Between Phase 3 
and 2 for the FR 18/FI Yoked Schedule of Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way 
ANOVA 









Table 3 (continued 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component Difference Scores Between Phase 3 
and 1 for the FR 18/FI Yoked Schedule of Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way 
ANOVA 










Mean Number of Responses Per Component Difference Scores Between Phase 2 
and 1 for the FR 18/FI Yoked Schedule of Reinforcement: Rule Message (2) x 
Dependence (2) Two-Way ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Rule Message 1 55603.12 2.30 
Dependence 1 17014.39 0.70 
Rule Message x Dependence 1 17528.88 0.73 
Error 36 24159.19 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component Difference Scores Between Phase 3 
and 2 for the FR 18/FI Yoked Schedule of Reinforcement: Rule Message (2) x 
Dependence (2) Two-Way ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Rule Message 1 37159.39 1.96 
Dependence 1 11683.75 0.62 
Rule Message x Dependence 1 52227.36 2.75 
Error 36 18986.92 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component Difference Scores Between Phase 3 
and 1 for the FR 18/FI Yoked Schedule of Reinforcement: Rule Message (2) x 




Rule Message x Dependence 
Error 
df MS F 
1 1852.05 0.07 
1 499.43 0.02 




Chi-Square Table for Subjects Who Showed Sensitive Versus Insensitive Behavior 
Patterns in Phase 2 of the FR 18/FI Yoked Schedule of Reinforcement. 
Group Sensitive Insensitive 
Rule-Following 1 9 
Dependent (1-67) (8.33) 
Rule-Following 1 9 
Nondependent (1-67) (8.33) 
Rule-Following Point 1 9 
Dependent (1.67) (8.33) 
Rule-Following Point 2 8 
Nondependent (1-67) (8.33) 
Rule Alone 2 8 
(1.67) (8.33) 
Minimal Instructions 3 7 
(1.67) (8.33) 
D.F = 5, Chi-Square =2.39, p = ns 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
Chi-Square Table for Subjects Who Showed Sensitive Versus Insensitive Behavior 
Patterns in Phase 3 of the FR 18/FI Yoked Schedule of Reinforcement. 
Group Sensitive Insensitive 
Rule-Following 3 7 
Dependent (2.83) (7.17) 
Rule-Following 2 8 
Nondependent (2.83) (7.17) 
Rule-Following Point 4 6 
Dependent (2.83) (7.17) 
Rule-Following Point 3 7 
Nondependent (2.83) (7.17) 
Rule Alone 2 8 
(2.83) (7.17) 
Minimal Instructions 3 7 
(2.83) (7.17) 
D.F = 5, Chi-Square = 1.41, p = ns 
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Table 6 
Mean Number of Points Per Component in Phase 1 for the FR 18 Schedule of 
Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Group 5 0.19 0.27 
Error 54 0.71 
Mean Number of Points Per Component in Phase 2 for the FI Yoked Schedule of 
Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Group 5 0.21 0.38 
Error 54 0.53 
Mean Number of Points Per Component in Phase 3 for the FT Yoked Schedule of 
Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Group 5 0.20 0.36 
Error 54 0.56 
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Table 7 
Mean Number of Points Per Component in Phase 1 for the FR 18 Schedule of 
Reinforcement: Rule Message (2) x Dependence (2) Two-Way ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Rule Message 1 0.36 0.46 
Dependence 1 0.21 0.27 
Rule Message x Dependence 1 0.01 0.01 
Error 36 0.79 
Mean Number of Points Per Component in Phase 2 for the FI Yoked Schedule of 
Reinforcement: Rule Message (2) x Dependence (2) Two-Way ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Rule Message 1 0.00 0.00 
Dependence 1 0.71 1.33 
Rule Message x Dependence 1 0.07 0.12 
Error 36 0.54 
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Table 7 (continued) 
Mean Number of Points Per Component in Phase 3 for the FI Yoked Schedule of 




Rule Message x Dependence 
Error 
df MS F 
1 0.01 0.02 
1 0.51 0.88 




Mean Number of Points Per Component Difference Scores Between Phase 2 and 
1 for the FR 18/FI Yoked Schedule of Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way 
ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Group 5 0.13 0.62 
Error 54 0.21 
Mean Number of Points Per Component Difference Scores Between Phase 3 and 
2 for the FR 18/FI Yoked Schedule of Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way 
ANOVA 









Table 8 (continued) 
Mean Number of Points Per Component Difference Scores Between Phase 3 and 
1 for the FR 18/FI Yoked Schedule of Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way 
ANOVA 










Mean Number of Points Per Component Difference Scores Between Phases 2 and 
1 for the FR 18/FI Yoked Schedule of Reinforcement: Rule Message (2) x 
Dependence (2) Two-Way ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Rule Message 1 0.34 1.57 
Dependence 1 0.15 0.70 
Rule Message x Dependence 1 0.03 0.16 
Error 36 0.21 
Mean Number of Points Per Component Difference Scores Between Phases 3 and 
2 for the FR 18/FI Yoked Schedule of Reinforcement: Rule Message (2) x 
Dependence (2) Two-Way ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Rule Message 1 0.01 0.13 
Dependence 1 0.02 0.23 
Rule Message x Dependence 1 0.00 0.00 
Error 36 0.08 
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Table 9 (continued) 
Mean Number of Points Per Component Difference Scores Between Phases 3 and 
1 for the FR 18/FI Yoked Schedule of Reinforcement: Rule Message (2) x 




Rule Message x Dependence 
Error 
df MS F 
1 0.23 0.78 
1 0.07 0.22 




Mean Fixed Interval Value for the FI Yoked Schedule of Reinforcement: Group 
(6) One-Way ANOVA 










Mean Component in Phase 2 or 3 in which Subjects Showed One IRT of Greater 
than Four Seconds for the FI Yoked Schedule of Reinforcement: Group (6) One-
Way ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Group 5 23.59 0.84 
Error 54 28.10 
Mean Component in Phase 2 or 3 in which Subjects Showed Four IRTs of 
Greater than Four Seconds for the FI Yoked Schedule of Reinforcement: Group 
(6) One-Way ANOVA 









Table 11 (continued) 
Mean Component in Phase 2 or 3 in which Subjects Showed Eight IRTs of 
Greater than Four Seconds for the FI Yoked Schedule of Reinforcement: Group 
(6) One-Way ANOVA 










Mean Number of Responses Per Component in Phase 2 for the FI Yoked 
Schedule of Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way ANACOVAR with Mean 
Component in Phase 2 or 3 in which Subjects Showed Eight IRTs of Greater than 
Four Seconds for the FI Yoked Schedule of Reinforcement as the Covariate 
Source df MS F 
Group 5 112023.55 0.62 
Error 53 19469.87 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component in Phase 3 for the FI Yoked 
Schedule of Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way ANACOVAR with Mean 
Component in Phase 2 or 3 in which Subjects Showed Eight IRTs of Greater than 
Four Seconds for the FI Yoked Schedule of Reinforcement as the Covariate 










Mean Number of Responses Per Component in Phase 2 for the FI Yoked 
Schedule of Reinforcement: Rule Message (2) x Dependence (2) Two-Way 
ANACOVAR with Mean Component in Phase 2 or 3 in which Subjects Showed 
Eight IRTs of Greater than Four Seconds for the FI Yoked Schedule of 




Rule Message x Dependence 
Error 
df MS F 
1 15016.65 0.91 
1 2772.49 0.17 
1 28320.87 1.71 
35 16562.25 
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Table 13 (continued) 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component in Phase 3 for the FI Yoked 
Schedule of Reinforcement: Rule Message (2) x Dependence (2) Two-Way 
ANACOVAR with Mean Component in Phase 2 or 3 in which Subjects Showed 
Eight IRTs of Greater than Four Seconds for the FI Yoked Schedule of 
Reinforcement as the Covariate 
Source df MS F 
Rule Message 1 6268.05 0.29 
Dependence 1 2376.27 0.11 
Rule Message x Dependence 1 3461.66 0.16 
Error 35 21951.00 
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Table 14 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component Difference Scores Between Phases 2 
and 1 for the FR 18/FI Yoked Schedule of Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way 
ANACOVAR with Mean Component in Phase 2 or 3 in which Subjects Showed 
Eight IRTs of Greater than Four Seconds for the FI Yoked Schedule of 
Reinforcement as the Covariate 
Source df MS F 
Group 5 21902.57 1.11 
Error 53 19758.78 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component Difference Scores Between Phases 3 
and 2 for the FR 18/FI Yoked Schedule of Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way 
ANACOVAR with Mean Component in Phase 2 or 3 in which Subjects Showed 
Eight IRTs of Greater than Four Seconds for the FI Yoked Schedule of 
Reinforcement as the Covariate 
Source df MS F 
Group 5 29183.04 1.46 
Error 53 20009.89 
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Table 14 (continued) 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component Difference Scores Between Phases 3 
and 1 for the FR 18/FI Yoked Schedule of Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way 
ANACOVAR with Mean Component in Phase 2 or 3 in which Subjects Showed 
Eight IRTs of Greater than Four Seconds for the FI Yoked Schedule of 
Reinforcement as the Covariate 










Mean Number of Responses Per Component Difference Scores Between Phases 2 
and 1 FR18 /FI Yoked Schedule of Reinforcement: Rule Message (2) x 
Dependence (2) Two-Way ANACOVAR with Mean Component in Phase 2 or 3 
in which Subjects Showed Eight IRTs of Greater than Four Seconds for the FI 
Yoked Schedule of Reinforcement as the Covariate 
Source df MS F 
Rule Message 1 52620.66 2.69 
Dependence 1 53710.08 2.75 
Rule Message x Dependence 1 24857.84 1.27 
Error 35 19547.93 
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Table 15 (continued) 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component Difference Scores Between Phases 3 
and 2 for the FR 18/FI Yoked Schedule of Reinforcement: Rule Message (2) x 
Dependence (2) Two-Way ANACOVAR with Mean Component in Phase 2 or 3 
in which Subjects Showed Eight IRTs of Greater than Four Seconds for the FI 




Rule Message x Dependence 
Error 
df MS F 
1 37059.83 1.90 
1 11821.15 0.61 
1 52477.51 2.69 
35 19522.08 
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Table 15 (continued) 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component Difference Scores Between Phases 3 
and 1 for the FR 18/FI Yoked Schedule of Reinforcement: Rule Message (2) x 
Dependence (2) Two-Way ANACOVAR with Mean Component in Phase 2 or 3 
in which Subjects Showed Eight IRTs of Greater than Four Seconds for the FI 
Yoked Schedule of Reinforcement as the Covariate 
Source df MS F 
Rule Message 1 1394.09 0.06 
Dependence 1 4271.20 0.19 
Rule Message x Dependence 1 7519.31 0.34 
Error 35 22024.84 
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Table 16 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component in Phase 1 for the DRL 6 Schedule 
of Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Group 5 339.55 3.36* 
Error 54 101.20 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component in Phase 2 for the FR 1 Schedule of 
Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Group 5 15363.46 2.55* 
Error 54 6018.15 
137 
Table 16 (continued) 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component in Phase 3 for the FR 1 Schedule of 
Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Group 5 18162.49 3.35* 
Error 54 5421.70 
* p < .05 
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Table 17 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component in Phase 1 for the DRL 6 Schedule 
of Reinforcement: Rule Message (2) x Dependence (2) Two-Way ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Rule Message 1 114.45 1.92 
Dependence 1 177.75 2.98 
Rule Message x Dependence 1 153.43 2.58 
Error 36 59.58 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component in Phase 2 for the FR 1 Schedule of 
Reinforcement: Rule Message (2) x Dependence (2) Two-Way ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Rule Message 1 17807.98 2.89 
Dependence 1 23730.05 3.85 
Rule Message x Dependence 1 3150.45 0.51 
Error 36 6163.35 
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Table 17 (continued) 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component in Phase 3 for the FR 1 Schedule of 
Reinforcement: Rule Message (2) x Dependence (2) Two-Way ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Rule Message 1 15875.84 2.25 
Dependence 1 22155.38 3.15 
Rule Message x Dependence 1 16275.98 2.31 
Error 36 7044.22 
140 
Table 18 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component Difference Scores Between Phases 2 
and 1 for the DRL 6/FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way 
ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Group 5 13356.99 2.35* 
Error 54 5677.42 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component Difference Scores Between Phases 3 
and 2 for the DRL 6/FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way 
ANOVA 









Table 18 (continued) 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component Difference Scores Between Phase 3 
and 1 for the DRL 6/FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way 
ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Group 5 15571.12 2.96* 
Error 54 5257.14 
* p < .05 
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Table 19 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component Difference Scores Between Phase 2 
and 1 for the DRL 6/FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement: Rule Message (2) x 
Dependence (2) Two-Way ANOVA 
Source df MS 
Rule Message 
Dependence 













Mean Number of Responses Per Component Difference Scores Between Phase 3 
and 2 for the DRL 6/FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement: Rule Message (2) x 




Rule Message x Dependence 
Error 
df MS F 
1 55.46 0.02 
1 27.03 0.01 
1 5104.89 1.80 
36 2830.08 
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Table 19 (continued) 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component Difference Scores Between Phase 3 
and 1 for the DRL 6/FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement: Rule Message (2) x 
Dependence (2) Two-Way ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Rule Message 1 13294.41 1.95 
Dependence 1 26302.03 3.85 
Rule Message x Dependence 1 13268.90 1.94 
Error 36 6827.14 
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Table 20 
Chi-Square Table for Subjects Who Showed Sensitive Versus Insensitive Behavior 
Patterns in Phase 2 of the DRL 6/FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement 
Group Sensitive Insensitive 
Rule-Following 8 2 
Dependent (8.17) (1.83) 
Rule-Following 9 1 
Nondependent (8.17) (1.83) 
Rule-Following Point 3 7 
Dependent (8.17) (1.83) 
Rule-Following Point 10 0 
Nondependent (8.17) (1.83) 
Rule Alone 9 1 
(8.17) (1.83) 
Minimal Instructions 10 0 
(8.17) (1.83) 
D.F = 5, Chi-Square =23.30, g < .001 
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Table 20 (continued) 
Chi-Square Table for Subjects Who Showed Sensitive Versus Insensitive Behavior 
Patterns in Phase 2 of the DRL 6/FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement 
Group Sensitive Insensitive 
Rule-Following 3 7 
Point Dependent (8.17) (1.83) 
Remaining 46 4 
Groups (40.83) (9.17) 
(d.f. = 1, Chi-Square = 17.45, p < .001). 
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Table 20 (continued) 
Chi-Square Table for Subjects Who Showed Sensitive Versus Insensitive 
(Insensitivity that Contacts Negative Rule Messages) Behavior Patterns in Phase 2 
of the DRL 6/FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement 
Group Sensitive Insensitive 
Rule-Following 8 2 
Dependent (8.67) (1.33) 
Rule-Following 10 0 
Nondependent (8.67) (1.33) 
Rule-Following Point 5 5 
Dependent (8.67) (1.33) 
Rule-Following Point 10 0 
Nondependent (8.67) (1.33) 
Rule Alone 9 1 
(8.67) (1.33) 
Minimal Instructions 10 0 
(8.67) (1.33) 
D.F = 5, Chi-Square = 17.510, g < .01 
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Table 20 (continued) 
Chi-Square Table for Subjects Who Showed Sensitive Versus Insensitive 
(Insensitivity That Contacts Negative Rule Messages) Behavior Patterns in Phase 
2 of the DRL 6/FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement. 
Group Sensitive Insensitive 
Rule-Following 5 5 
Point Dependent (8.67) (1.33) 
Remaining 47 3 
Groups (55.32) (6.67) 
(d.f. = 1, Chi-Square = 10.41, p < .01). 
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Table 20 (continued) 
Chi-Square Table for Subjects Who Showed Sensitive Versus Insensitive Behavior 
Patterns in Phase 3 of the DRL 6/FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement 
Group Sensitive Insensitive 
Rule-Following 8 2 
Dependent (8.5) (1.5) 
Rule-Following 9 1 
Nondependent (8.5) (1.5) 
Rule-Following Point 6 4 
Dependent (8.5) (1.5) 
Rule-Following Point 9 1 
Nondependent (8.5) (1.5) 
Rule Alone 9 1 
(8.5) (1.5) 
Minimal Instructions 10 0 
(8.5) (1.5) 
D.F = 5, (Chi-Square = 7.451, g > 0.20 
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Table 21 
Mean Number of Points Per Component in Phase 1 for the DRL 6 Schedule of 
Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Group 5 0.042 0.43 
Error 54 0.10 
Mean Number of Points Per Component in Phase 2 for the FR 1 Schedule of 
Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Group 5 198.48 2.54* 
Error 54 78.03 
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Table 21 (continued) 
Mean Number of Points Per Component in Phase 3 for the FR 1 Schedule of 
Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Group 5 266.35 3.87* 
Error 54 68.78 
* |2 < .05 
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Table 22 
Mean Number of Points Per Component in Phase 1 for the DRL 6 Schedule of 
Reinforcement: Rule Message (2) x Dependence (2) Two-Way ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Rule Message 1 0.00 0.00 
Dependence 1 0.10 1.57 
Rule Message x Dependence 1 0.01 0.17 
Error 36 0.06 
Mean Number of Points Per Component in Phase 2 for the FR 1 Schedule of 
Reinforcement: Rule Message (2) x Dependence (2) Two-Way ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Rule Message 1 319.28 3.91 
Dependence 1 271.70 3.33 
Rule Message x Dependence 1 72.93 0.89 
Error 36 81.70 
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Table 22 (continued) 
Mean Number of Points Per Component in Phase 3 for the FR 1 Schedule of 
Reinforcement: Rule Message (2) x Dependence (2) Two-Way ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Rule Message 1 340.82 3.81 
Dependence 1 223.45 2.50 
Rule Message x Dependence 1 409.73 4.58* 
Error 36 89.54 
* g < .05 
153 
Table 23 
Mean Number of Points Per Component Difference Scores Between Phase 2 and 
1 for the DRL 6/FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Group 5 198.02 2.54* 
Error 54 
Mean Number of Points Per Component Difference Scores Between Phase 3 and 
2 for the DRL 6/FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Group 5 28.08 0.67 
Error 54 41.83 
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Table 23 (continued) 
Mean Number of Points Per Component Difference Scores Between Phase 3 and 
1 for the DRL 6/FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Group 
Error 







Mean Number of Points Per Component Difference Scores Between Phases 2 and 
1 with the DRL 6/FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement: Rule Message (2) x 
Dependence (2) Two-Way ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Rule Message 1 319.28 3.94 
Dependence 1 282.23 3.48 
Rule Message x Dependence 1 71.16 0.88 
Error 36 81.09 
Mean Number of Points Per Component Difference Scores Between Phases 3 and 
2 for the DRL 6/FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement: Rule Message (2) x 
Dependence (2) Two-Way ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Rule Message 1 0.35 0.01 
Dependence 1 2.36 0.06 
Rule Message x Dependence 1 136.94 3.53 
Error 36 38.80 
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Table 24 (continued) 
Mean Number of Points Per Component Difference Scores Between Phases 3 and 
1 with the DRL 6/FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement: Rule Message (2) x 
Dependence (2) Two-Way ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Rule Message 1 340.82 3.84 
Dependence 1 234.00 2.63 
Rule Message x Dependence 1 405.51 4.57* 
Error 36 88.67 
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Table 25 
Mean Component in Phase 2 or 3 in which Subjects Showed One IRT of Less 
than Two Seconds for the FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way 
ANOVA 
Source df MS F 
Group 5 1.99 1.28 
Error 54 1.55 
Mean Component in Phase 2 or 3 in which Subjects Showed Four IRTs of Less 
than Two Seconds for the FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way 
ANOVA 









Table 25 (continued) 
Mean Component in Phase 2 or 3 in which Subjects Showed Eight IRTs of Less 
than Two Seconds for the FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way 
ANOVA 










Mean Number of Responses Per Component in Phase 2 for the FR 1 Schedule of 
Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way ANACOVAR with Mean Component in 
Phase 2 or 3 in which Subjects Showed Eight IRTs of Less than Two Seconds for 
the FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement as the Covariate 
Source df MS F 
Group 5 10155.41 2.59* 
Error 53 3928.44 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component in Phase 3 for the FR 1 Schedule of 
Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way ANACOVAR with Mean Component in 
Phase 2 or 3 in which Subjects Showed Eight IRTs of Less than Two Seconds for 
the FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement as the Covariate 










Mean Number of Responses Per Component in Phase 2 for the FR 1 Schedule of 
Reinforcement: Rule Message (2) x Dependence (2) Two-Way ANACOVAR 
with Mean Component in Phase 2 or 3 in which Subjects Showed Eight IRTs of 
Less than Two Seconds for the FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement as the Covariate 
Source df MS F 
Rule Message 1 16750.70 3.94* 
Dependence 1 6940.20 1.63 
Rule Message x Dependence 1 5188.83 1.22 
Error 35 4251.31 
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Table 27 (continued) 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component in Phase 3 for the FR 1 Schedule of 
Reinforcement: Rule Message (2) x Dependence (2) Two-Way ANACOVAR 
with Mean Component in Phase 2 or 3 in which Subjects Showed Eight IRTs of 




Rule Message x Dependence 
Error 
df MS F 
1 15148.59 2.46 
1 9297.81 1.51 
1 19309.41 3.14 
35 6147.45 
*2 = .055 
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Table 28 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component Difference Scores Between Phases 2 
and 1 for the DRL 6/FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way 
ANACOVAR with Mean Component in Phase 2 or 3 in which Subjects Showed 
Eight IRTs of Less than Two Seconds for the FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement as 
the Covariate 
Source df MS F 
Group 5 7889.14 2.14* 
Error 53 3684.47 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component Difference Scores Between Phases 3 
and 2 for the DRL 6/FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way 
ANACOVAR with Mean Component in Phase 2 or 3 in which Subjects Showed 
Eight IRTs of Less than Two Seconds for the FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement as 
the Covariate 
Source df MS F 
Group 
Error 
5 1087.69 0.40 
53 2746.84 
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Table 28 (continued) 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component Difference Scores Between Phases 3 
and 1 for the DRL 6/FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement: Group (6) One-Way 
ANACOVAR with Mean Component in Phase 2 or 3 in which Subjects Showed 
Eight IRTs of Less than Two Seconds for the FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement as 
the Covariate 
Source df MS F 
Group 
Error 








Mean Number of Responses Per Component Difference Scores Between Phases 2 
and 1 for the DRL 6/FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement: Rule Message (2) x 
Dependence (2) Two-Way ANACOVAR with Mean Component in Phase 2 or 3 
in which Subjects Showed Eight IRTs of Less than Two Seconds for the FR 1 
Schedule of Reinforcement as the Covariate 
Source df MS F 
Rule Message 1 14130.38 3.53 
Dependence 1 9722.49 2.43 
Rule Message x Depend 1 3492.25 0.87 
Error 35 4003.38 
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Table 29 (continued) 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component Difference Scores Between Phases 3 
and 2 for the DRL 6/FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement: Rule Message (2) x 
Dependence (2) Two-Way ANACOVAR with Mean Component in Phase 2 or 3 
in which Subjects Showed Eight IRTs of Less than Two Seconds for the FR 1 




Rule Message x Dependence 
Error 
df MS F 
1 40.26 0.01 
1 172.06 0.06 
1 4478.92 1.63 
35 2753.20 
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Table 29 (continued) 
Mean Number of Responses Per Component Difference Scores Between Phases 3 
and 1 for the DRL 6/FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement: Rule Message (2) x 
Dependence (2) Two-Way ANACOVAR with Mean Component in Phase 2 or 3 
in which Subjects Showed Eight IRTs of Less than Two Seconds for the FR 1 
Schedule of Reinforcement as the Covariate 
Source df MS F 
Rule Message 1 4930.19 0.98 
Dependence 1 19053.27 3.78* 
Rule Message x Dependence 1 14471.38 2.87 
Error 35 5036.30 









































Figure 1: Mean Number of Responses Per Phase Per 
Component, FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement 
(After DRL 6), Point of Contact Used as Covariate 
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Figure 2: Mean Difference in Number of Responses Per 
Component, DRL 6 / FR 1 Schedule of Reinforcement 



















Mean Number of Responses Per phase 
Responses DRL6/FR1 Response FR18/FI Yoked 
GR RM DE Ph 1 Ph2 Ph3 Ph 1 Ph 2 Ph 3 
1 1 1 18.00 32.75 269.88 588.67 526.50 599.63 
1 1 1 14.67 38.25 30.00 486.33 350.63 316.25 
1 1 1 18.67 137.25 250.13 518.00 405.00 375.88 
1 1 1 17.00 283.13 281.38 622.00 136.75 295.13 
1 1 1 34.33 268.88 301.00 666.33 259.00 380.75 
1 1 1 64.67 233.00 245.25 488.33 216.50 240.88 
1 1 1 21.00 26.88 31.88 318.67 375.00 404.00 
1 1 1 18.00 40.25 103.75 349.67 265.13 140.75 
1 1 1 16.67 192.50 269.00 442.67 84.63 20.50 
1 1 1 23.00 223.75 256.63 642.67 127.50 68.38 
2 1 2 16.67 197.88 280.13 631.00 628.88 458.50 
2 1 2 14.67 221.13 213.25 320.33 349.13 238.88 
2 1 2 15.67 17.13 11.50 582.00 530.25 504.13 
2 1 2 18.67 238.13 262.13 315.33 133.63 92.88 
2 1 2 16.33 196.13 228.13 349.67 99.50 95.25 
2 1 2 17.33 195.50 256.88 612.33 101.13 29.63 
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68 2 1 2 17.67 247.25 296.63 538.33 227.00 166.13 
73 2 1 2 16.67 221.38 234.50 439.00 308.63 275.63 
79 2 1 2 17.00 161.25 194.38 566.33 493.63 95.38 
89 2 1 2 14.00 90.50 128.63 465.00 402.00 348.38 
5 3 2 1 20.67 133.25 143.50 517.33 342.00 220.63 
13 3 2 1 14.67 33.75 38.50 527.67 542.13 452.63 
17 3 2 1 17.00 156.13 202.88 364.33 270.38 31.50 
22 3 2 1 15.67 135.63 198.13 623.67 391.38 254.75 
25 3 2 1 14.67 18.38 34.50 386.67 255.63 273.88 
31 3 2 1 21.00 215.38 236.75 415.67 316.38 393.88 
43 3 2 1 17.00 67.63 117.25 539.67 437.38 238.75 
44 3 2 1 19.33 64.75 31.88 472.00 257.50 310.00 
45 3 2 1 15.33 14.50 202.25 412.33 547.63 27.38 
50 3 2 1 17.67 37.75 31.38 858.67 545.25 465.50 
4 4 2 2 15.67 62.88 156.88 585.00 576.38 597.00 
14 4 2 2 18.00 210.88 215.00 373.33 29.38 22.38 
15 4 2 2 19.67 230.38 244.00 453.33 401.88 388.75 
26 4 2 2 18.67 110.25 200.38 478.00 321.50 387.63 
36 4 2 2 16.67 209.88 237.25 473.33 203.13 67.75 
48 4 2 2 14.67 79.75 116.50 455.00 366.38 236.25 
55 4 2 2 17.67 140.50 185.63 475.67 454.63 340.63 
57 4 2 2 16.33 202.00 264.75 505.67 452.13 29.75 
65 4 2 2 16.00 186.38 297.88 554.00 335.88 441.13 
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82 4 2 2 16.67 108.88 192.88 295.00 288.50 62.63 
9 5 20.67 265.00 202.63 579.00 330.75 239.75 
19 5 19.00 139.75 208.63 357.67 157.88 120.25 
20 5 22.67 202.00 196.38 355.00 47.88 55.88 
29 5 31.33 233.38 261.75 470.67 128.13 159.00 
30 5 16.67 188.88 253.00 619.33 638.25 584.38 
32 5 16.00 163.63 259.25 566.67 559.13 291.88 
69 5 13.33 36.88 88.50 527.67 545.63 526.00 
70 5 19.67 96.25 213.13 568.67 474.63 390.00 
72 5 24.33 185.75 248.75 413.33 110.75 189.25 
80 5 18.33 227.63 226.13 541.00 276.50 107.50 
1 6 17.00 133.63 262.63 453.33 557.50 44.75 
7 6 71.33 285.50 291.88 527.33 298.13 49.63 
8 6 17.67 127.38 194.88 363.67 225.38 38.75 
12 6 23.67 „ 250.38 265.50 470.67 31.50 30.88 
41 6 46.67 24.38 213.13 329.67 376.88 471.50 
53 6 28.00 240.75 271.13 515.33 525.38 482.63 
58 6 25.33 274.00 332.88 719.00 630.13 332.00 
83 6 16.33 228.75 211.63 357.33 112.75 69.63 
95 6 49.67 253.38 228.38 354.67 288.13 274.13 
97 6 17.33 202.75 258.88 519.33 359.13 181.13 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 e 9 10 II 12 13 14 IS 16 17 IB 1» 20 21 22 23 24 
Rule-Messages 
DRL 6/FR 18 FR 1/FI Yoked Withdrawn 
S44 
1 2 3 4 3 6 7 B 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 IB 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Rule-Messages 
DRL 6/FR 18 FR 1/FI Yoked 
S50 













Components of the Multiple Schedule 
DRL 6/FR 1 
Rule-Following-Point Nondependent 
Rule—Messages 
_ DRL 6/FR 18 FR 1/FI Yoked 







1 2 3 4 9 6 7 S 9 10 11 12 13 14 IS 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Rule-Messages 




1 2 3 4 9 6 7 6 9 10 11 12 13 14 19 16 17 16 19 20 21 22 23 2< 
Rule-Messages 
DRL 6/FR 18 FR 1/FI Yoked 
900 -t ' 
Withdrawn 
S36 
1 2 3 « 3 6 7 8 9 10 11 1! 13 14 IS IS 17 H l» 30 21 22 23 24 
Rule-Messages 
DRL 6/FR 18 FR 1 /Fl Yoked Withdrawn 
S14 
1 2 3 4 9 6 7 6 9 10 11 12 13 14 19 16 17 IB 19 20 21 22 23 2* 
Rule-Messages 
DRL 6/FR 18 FR 1 /Fl Yoked Withdrawn 
S26 
1 2 3 4 9 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 t9 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Rule-Messages 
DRL 6/FR 18 FR 1/FI Yoked Withdrawn 
S48 



















Components of the Multiple Schedule 
DRL 6/FR 1 
Rule-Following-Point Nondependent 
Rule—Messages Rule-Messages 








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 16 19 20 21 22 23 24 
FR 1/FI Yoked DRL 6/FR Withdrawn 
S57 400 -
200 -
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IB 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Rule—Messages Rule-Messages 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 IS 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 




1 2 3 4 S 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 IS 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Components of the Multiple Schedule 
DRL 6/FR 1 
Rule Alone 
Rule-Messages 









1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 It 12 13 14 IS 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Rule-Messages 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 IS 15 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Rule-Messages 
DRL 6/FR 18 FR 1/FI Yoked Withdrawn 
S19 
1 2 3 4 9 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 IS 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 2« 
Rule-Messages 
DRL 6/FR 18 FR 1/FI Yoked Withdrawn 
S29 
1 2 3 4 S 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Rule-Messages 
DRL 6/FR 18 FR 1/FI Yoked Withdrawn 
S32 



















Components of the Multiple Schedule 
DRL 6/FR 1 
Rule Alone 
Rule-Messages 























V \ A  •  •  
1 2 3 4 9 6 7 a 9 to 11 12 13 t4 19 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Rule-Messages 
DRL 6/FR 18 FR \/F\ Yoked Withdrawn 
1 2 3 4 9 6 7 8 9 10 It 12 13 14 IS 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 1 2 3 4 9 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 19 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Components of the Multiple Schedule 
DRL 6/FR 1 
Minimal Rule 
Rule—Messages 
FR 1/FI Yoked DRL 6/FR 1 Withdrawn 
SI 
300 -
1 2 3 « 5 6 7 S 9 10 It 12 13 14 IS 16 17 IB 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Rule-Messages 
FR 1/FI Yoked DRL 6/FR Withdrawn 
S8 400 -
300 -
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Rule-Messages 






1 2 3 4 3 6 7 S 9 10 II 12 13 14 IS 16 17 IB 1» 20 21 22 23 24 
Rule-Messages 
DRL 6/FR 18 FR 1/FI Yoked Withdrawn 
S7 
1 2 3 4 3 6 7 B 9 10 11 12 13 14 13 16 17 IB 19 20 21 22.23 24 
Rule-Messages 
DRL 6/FR 18 FR 1/FI Yoked Withdrawn 
S12 
-S r~r T 7 T^T: i i i 
1 2 3 * 3 6 7 8 9  1 0  1 1  12 13 14 IS 16 17 16 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Rule-Messages 
DRL 6/FR 18 FR 1/F! Yoked Withdrawn 
S53 



















Components of the Multiple Schedule 
DRL 6/FR 1 
Minimal Rule 196 
Rule-Messages 













DRL 6/FR 18 FR 1/FI Yoked Withdrawn 
Rule-Messages 
DRL 6/FR 18 FR 1/FI Yoked Withdrawn 
*a> - S83 
0 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
1 2 1 4 9 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 19 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Rule—Messages 
DRL 6/FR 18 FR 1/FI Yoked Withdrawn S00 -i -
S97 
100 -
o I i i i i i "Tm 'i^1 r— i i i "• i i v 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 B 9 10 11 12 13 14 13 16 17 16 '9 20 21 22 23 24 
Components of the Multiple Schedule 
DRL 6/FR 1 
